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Hungary, Europe and Russia: a complicated set of relationships

  • Writer: Matthew Parish
    Matthew Parish
  • Mar 25
  • 4 min read


Hungary’s cautious approach to criticising Russia, particularly evident in her abstaining from recent European Council statements condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, reflects a complex interplay of political, economic, and strategic factors rooted in Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s leadership and Hungary’s national interests. To understand Prime Minister Orbán's position towards Russia, we must look into Hungary recent political and economic history and her future elections.


Hungary’s Position in the European Council


In earlier March 2025, Hungary notably diverged from the European Union consensus by opposing additional sanctions on Russia during a Brussels summit attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. While other EU leaders agreed to impose further sanctions notwithstanding Prime Minister Orbán's opposition, effectively eviscerating Hungary's imagined veto, Prime Minister Orbán’s refusal to accede to what had been agreed by the EU's other 26 member highlighted fractures (and the United Kingdom, which acts in unison with EU sanctions and even greater ferocity) within EU unity. Despite this opposition, diplomats expressed confidence that Hungary would eventually align with with the EU sanctions regime. Hungarian direct trade with Russia is miniscule, so Hungary's abstention from increased European sanctions on Russia is of marginal effect at best.


Furthermore at the same time Hungary proposed transforming Ukraine into a “buffer zone” between Russia and Europe, a stance resonant with Kremlin rhetoric. Hungarian EU minister János Bóka justified this position by anticipating shifts in US foreign policy and questioning the efficacy of sanctions against Russia, suggesting they might impede peace processes. This divergence prompted informal discussions among EU diplomats about potential repercussions for Hungary, including the possibility of revoking her veto power in certain areas of policy making. 


Viktor Orbán’s Political Evolution and Relations with Russia


Viktor Orbán’s political trajectory has been marked by significant shifts. Initially serving as Prime Minister from 1998 to 2002 with the center-right Fidesz party, Orbán was pro-European and advocated for Hungary’s integration into Western structures. However since returning to power as Prime Minister in 2010, Orbán has led Fidesz in a more nationalist and Eurosceptic direction, often challenging EU policies and fostering closer diplomatic ties with authoritarian regimes, notably Russia. It seems that this change in direction was motivated by populism - i.e. the will of the electorate, that had not found European Union membership as beneficial for their country as they had anticipated. This was particularly because a lower percentage of young Hungarian citizens take the opportunity to live and work in other EU member states than many other new EU entrants. Therefore Hungarians saw prices at home go up without salaries doing the same and without remittances from abroad taking place in substantial quantities.


Orbán’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has been characterised by mutual interests and strategic cooperation. Both leaders share nationalist ideologies and a scepticism toward Western liberalism, leading to strengthened economic and political ties between Hungary and Russia. This alignment has facilitated various agreements, including significant energy projects. 


The Paks II Nuclear Power Plant Project


A cornerstone of Hungary-Russia cooperation is the Paks II nuclear power plant project. Negotiated in January 2014, when economic relations between Russia and Europe were optimistic, and before Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, the final grant of the licence leading to construction works was not however issued until August 2023. This deal involves Russian investment and technology to construct two new reactors south of Budapest using some EUR10 billion in loans from Russian banks (i.e. repayment is currently unenforceable due to European banking sanctions against Russia) running to 2046. The two adjacent light water nuclear power plants (units 5 and 6 at Paks) are expected to have a lifetime of sixty years, once constructed. Their future operation and maintenance remain uncertain in the event of the terms on which the war in Ukraine is ended (or not) and Russia's rehabilitation into the international community.


Orbán’s Strategic Balancing Act


Orbán’s approach reflects a nuanced strategy aimed at balancing relations with both Russia and the European Union. By maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, Orbán leverages potential veto power over EU sanctions as a bargaining tool to secure favourable terms and funding from the EU, particularly when that funding has been suspended or cut due to concerns over the deteriorating quality of Hungary's judicial independence, a key cornerstone of EU governance principles. Simultaneously Hungary continues to support certain EU initiatives, such as keeping the Ukraine-Hungary border open and assenting to the periodic renewal of sanctions, demonstrating a calculated effort to navigate between competing interests.


Domestic Political Landscape and Upcoming Elections


Domestically, Orbán faces challenges from a pro-European opposition that criticises his Eastern alliances and advocates for stronger integration with Western institutions. With forthcoming elections, Orbán must address public dissatisfaction stemming from perceptions that Hungary has not reaped the full benefits of EU membership compared to other member states. His diplomatic manoeuvres aim to position Hungary advantageously, ensuring continued investment and leveraging geopolitical relationships to bolster domestic support.


Hungary's next general election is due by April 2026, and at the current time Fidesz, Orbán's party, is trailing the leading opposition party Tisza, let by its charismatic leader Péter Magyar, a former member of Fidesz who in April 2024 resigned the party, denouncing the direction in which Orbán had been taking Fidesz. In less than a year he has taken his own political party to higher polling figures than Fidesz, and that trend seems to be continuing. Therefore the degree of detachment Orbán displays from EU institutions and the fight for Ukraine seems to have disgruntled his electorate, particularly a new youth, who want a definitively pro-European rather than pro-Russian future.


Conclusion


Hungary’s reluctance to criticise Russia publicly and her strategic positioning within the EU reflect a complex interplay of historical ties, economic dependencies, and political calculations under Viktor Orbán’s leadership. By carefully balancing relationships with both Eastern and Western powers, Orbán seeks to navigate Hungary through a turbulent geopolitical landscape while addressing domestic political imperatives. However whether this remains a policy gambit that will win over the electorate in barely a year's time, remains to be seen.

 
 

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