How the West can stop its components arming Russian strikes on Ukraine

In October 2025 Ukrainian authorities again reported that enormous numbers of foreign-made components were recovered from Russian drones and missiles used in mass strikes on Ukrainian cities. The items named ranged from mundane resistors and switching connectors to microcontrollers, sensors and power converters manufactured by companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Korea and elsewhere. That revelation is not a surprise; for more than three years investigators, think tanks and parliamentary committees have documented a steady flow of commercial electronics and “dual-use” parts into Russian military programmes despite sanctions and export controls. 

Stopping that flow will not be achieved by a single action. It requires three mutually reinforcing strategies: (1) tighten and modernise controls on dual-use exports and financial logistics, (2) disrupt diversion networks and supply-chain intermediaries, and (3) shrink demand by helping Ukraine and its partners provide substitutes and forensic deterrence. Each area demands technical detail, international coordination, and politically difficult trade-offs between security and open trade.

Tighten and modernise export controls and supplier compliance

Western sanctions and export licences must be brought up to the tempo of modern supply chains. Existing lists of controlled items are necessary but insufficient: many components used in weapons are mass-market semiconductors and sensors not traditionally deemed “military items”, yet they are critical to guidance, telemetry, power regulation and communications. Policymakers should expand control lists for specific component classes and, crucially, move from static lists to risk-based screening systems that evaluate transactions by end-use and customer profile rather than by item number alone. The US Department of Commerce’s recent moves to automate screening and to identify high-risk addresses are steps in this direction. 

Industry compliance must be hardened. Governments should issue clear, legally binding guidance and red-flag lists to suppliers, together with mandatory reporting obligations when companies detect suspicious orders or routing patterns. Financial regulators and export control agencies should require that firms perform “know-your-customer” checks on foreign distributors and intermediaries that buy microelectronics in bulk. Where firms willfully or negligently supply parts that reasonably appear destined for military diversion, they should face meaningful fines and debarment from government contracts. Public-private cooperation — sharing of red flags and suspicious party lists — will be essential to make this practical. 

Disrupt diversion networks and the logistics that enable them

Most western parts reach Russia not by direct purchase from western manufacturers, but via long, opaque chains of brokers, shell companies and transhipments through third countries. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong and China have repeatedly been named as jurisdictions through which components transit or are re-exported. Western governments must therefore couple export control tightening with diplomatic and operational measures aimed at these intermediaries.

At the diplomatic level this means intensive bilateral and multilateral engagement to improve customs enforcement, share trade-screening intelligence, and close legal loopholes that allow re-export. Where states tolerate or facilitate diversion, multilateral pressure — restrictions on freight services, targeted sanctions on brokers and logistics firms, and secondary sanctions where appropriate — should be used to change cost-benefit calculations. Public naming and shaming of companies and addresses shown to have diverted parts can also deter routine facilitation. Recent investigative work has shown how persistent and structured such diversion networks are, arguing for sustained, coordinated action. 

Operationally, customs and port authorities must be given both the technical tools and the mandate to inspect suspect shipments. That calls for investment in high-throughput scanning, better manifest transparency, and advanced risk-analytics shared across borders. Financial intelligence units should prioritise payments that show patterns consistent with diversion chains — for example, multiple small payments routed through shell companies, or rapid re-invoicing. The West should also work with major logistics companies, freight insurers and container lines to adopt compliance checks and to refuse to carry consignments linked to flagged intermediaries.

Reduce demand, expand alternatives, and build forensic deterrence

Even with tighter controls and disrupted logistics, some components will continue to leak. Reducing the ability of Russia’s military industry to integrate those parts requires two complementary lines of work.

First, reduce demand by shrinking Russia’s ability to refurbish or mass-produce complex weapons. That means continuing to choke key inputs — specialised machine tools, testing equipment, and embedded systems — through targeted export controls and by depriving the Russian defence sector of revenues (for example, by following energy and commodity interdiction strategies). Second, help Ukraine and friendly suppliers offer legitimate substitutes cheaply and at scale: subsidise production of critical parts within allied jurisdictions, support supply-chain resilience programmes, and provide modular components that are easier to track and authenticate.

Forensic deterrence is the third plank. Ukraine and her partners should document and publish well-evidenced trace analyses of recovered weapon components, using serial numbers, manufacturing marks and supply-chain records to show provenance. Public, verifiable attribution exposes diversion channels and raises reputational costs for intermediary firms and states. Recent reporting and NGO work has already demonstrated how tracing components back through shipments can illuminate patterns that sanctions authorities can act upon. 

Use financial measures and corporate accountability

Cutting off the money and the corporate facilitators is as important as blocking parts. Authorities should expand the use of targeted sanctions against brokers, trading houses and servicing firms that knowingly facilitate diversion. Banks and payment processors must be required to screen customers and transaction patterns for diversion signatures. Financial penalties, combined with enforcement actions against complicit firms, will shift the economics of diversion.

Equally important is corporate liability. Governments should adopt fines and debarment policies proportionate to the harm caused, coupled with incentives for companies that adopt robust anti-diversion compliance programmes. Financial incentives — tax breaks, preferential procurement status — can encourage the semiconductor and electronics industry to police their distribution chains proactively.

Anticipate trade-offs and avoid undue harm to civilians

Any policy to constrict component flows entails costs. Overbroad restrictions risk damaging legitimate civilian industries, harming small firms that rely on global supply chains, and blocking humanitarian or reconstruction goods. Therefore measures should be narrowly tailored, intelligence-led, and reversible when appropriate. Where export controls impose burdens, governments should offer compliance support to small and medium enterprises so that legitimate trade can continue without creating diversion risk.

Conclusion

Halting the presence of western-manufactured components in Russian drones and missiles is not a matter of moral exhortation alone; it is a technically detailed, politically demanding campaign requiring export-control modernisation, aggressive action on diversion networks, financial pressure, corporate accountability and forensic transparency. It is also a contest of endurance: diversion actors adapt quickly, so counter-measures must be dynamic, intelligence-driven and coordinated across the G7, EU and like-minded partners. To be effective, Western policy must combine legal tightening with practical assistance to companies and customs authorities, and it must be prepared to apply costly consequences to intermediaries that facilitate the flow of parts. Only a sustained, whole-of-society approach — from ministries to manufacturers, from ports to payment systems — will significantly reduce the components that enable Russian strikes on Ukraine. 

---

Policy Brief for G7 Export Control Leads

Title:

Closing the Circuit: Coordinated G7 Measures to Stop Western Components in Russian Weapons Systems

Purpose:

To recommend actionable, time-bound steps for G7 governments to prevent the use of Western-manufactured components in Russian drones and missiles striking Ukraine.

I. Situation Overview

Investigations since 2022 have found Western-origin semiconductors, sensors, and power systems in over 70 per cent of Russian precision-guided weapons recovered in Ukraine. These parts reach Russia primarily through complex diversion chains involving distributors in third countries such as Turkey, the UAE, Hong Kong, and China. Current export controls are static and fragmented, relying on outdated classification lists and inconsistent enforcement.

II. Strategic Objectives

1. Close the legal and logistical pathways through which Western dual-use goods reach Russian defence industries.

2. Impose real economic consequences for companies and intermediaries that enable diversion.

3. Create an adaptive monitoring system to identify and stop new channels as they emerge.

III. Recommended Actions

1. Expand and Modernise Export Controls (0–6 months)

• Adopt a risk-based, dynamic export screening regime that assesses transaction context, not only product classification.

• Update dual-use lists quarterly to reflect battlefield forensics from Ukraine.

• Mandate supplier “know-your-customer” (KYC) procedures for all distributors of high-risk electronic components.

2. Coordinate Enforcement through a G7 Task Force (6–12 months)

• Create a G7 Export Enforcement Coordination Cell (EECC) under rotating chairmanship.

• Share red-flag data, end-user blacklists, and suspicious shipment intelligence.

• Develop shared standards for penalties and debarment.

3. Target Diversion Networks (Ongoing)

• Establish joint customs operations in key transit hubs with Europol, Interpol, and regional partners.

• Impose secondary sanctions on logistics firms, freight forwarders, and financial institutions that repeatedly facilitate re-export.

• Negotiate bilateral inspection agreements with Turkey and the UAE for high-risk cargo.

4. Increase Transparency and Forensic Attribution (0–12 months)

• Support Ukraine’s component-forensics unit through funding and equipment to trace parts.

• Publish verified supply-chain case studies quarterly to name complicit intermediaries.

• Encourage industry cooperation by providing anonymised feedback to manufacturers.

5. Promote Corporate Compliance and Accountability (0–18 months)

• Introduce legal liability for reckless or negligent supply of high-risk components.

• Offer tax incentives or procurement preferences for firms maintaining verified compliance systems.

• Require semiconductor manufacturers to embed traceable micro-tags for tracking post-sale.

IV. Resource Implications

• Estimated initial budget: €100 million across G7 partners for shared intelligence infrastructure, compliance training, and field inspections.

• Expected benefit: measurable reduction in Western-origin components recovered from Russian munitions by at least 50% within two years.

V. Monitoring & Evaluation

• Annual audit coordinated by OECD or similar body.

• Progress metrics: volume of intercepted dual-use exports, number of sanctioned entities, forensic identification rates of Western components.

---

Industry Explainer — Compliance Red Flags and Practical Steps

Title:

Keeping Your Products Out of the Battlefield: A Guide for Exporters and Distributors

Why this matters

Even the smallest sensor or chip can end up powering a weapon that strikes a Ukrainian apartment block. Firms that supply high-tech components, even for civilian uses, must act to prevent their products being diverted to Russia’s war industry.

Key Red Flags

1. Unusual purchasing patterns – small but repeated orders for high-value microelectronics.

2. End-user ambiguity – customers refuse to identify the final application or provide vague certificates.

3. Third-country routing – orders routed through jurisdictions with weak export controls (e.g. Turkey, UAE, Hong Kong).

4. Inconsistent documentation – invoices with mismatched product codes, addresses, or currencies.

5. Rapid payment cycles – multiple payments from unrelated entities, suggesting layered financing.

Compliance Best Practices

1. Conduct Enhanced Due Diligence

   
   

   • Verify the identity and legitimacy of each customer and their stated end-use.

   • Screen all counterparties against national and G7 sanctions lists.

   
   

2. Implement Internal Export Controls

   
   

   • Require written end-use statements for all shipments above a threshold value.

   • Maintain export records for at least five years for audit purposes.

   
   

3. Monitor Supply Chains Continuously

   
   

   • Use automated transaction-screening tools and AI-driven risk alerts.

   • Conduct periodic distributor audits, especially in high-risk jurisdictions.

   
   

4. Report Suspicious Activity

   
   

   • Establish confidential internal channels to escalate concerns.

   • Notify national export authorities or law enforcement when diversion is suspected.

   
   

5. Engage in Industry Collaboration

   
   

   • Join export control partnerships or industry associations.

   • Share anonymised data on diversion attempts and suspicious counterparties.

   
   

Your legal obligations

• Supplying dual-use goods that reach sanctioned Russian entities may result in criminal liability, fines, or loss of export privileges.

• Exporters are accountable even when intermediaries perform the diversion.

• Compliance reduces risk, protects reputation, and supports Ukraine’s defence.

Summary

Western manufacturers and distributors play a decisive role in safeguarding Ukraine by ensuring their technologies are not weaponised. The moral, legal, and reputational stakes are high; by embedding robust compliance and vigilance, the private sector can help close the technological lifeline sustaining Russia’s war effort.