From Legacy to Resilience: The Evolution of Ukraine’s Military Doctrine Since 2014

Ukraine’s military doctrine has undergone a profound transformation since 2014. The annexation of Crimea and the eruption of war in the Donbas revealed the inadequacy of Ukraine’s post-Soviet military structure and prompted a strategic overhaul. Over the following decade, Ukraine would evolve from a neglected, Soviet-inherited defence establishment into a war-tempered force increasingly integrated with Western operational principles. This essay explores Ukraine’s doctrinal evolution, illustrated by battlefield examples and underpinned by relevant strategic theory, from hybrid resistance to the formulation of a total war strategy.

Before 2014: Doctrinal Drift in the Shadow of Russia

Before 2014 Ukraine’s military doctrine remained ambivalent, shaped by conflicting strategic interests. The 2004 and 2012 doctrines reflected aspirations for neutrality, attempting to straddle cooperation with both NATO and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Yet this stance left Ukraine exposed: it neglected the growing revanchism of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy and failed to prioritise readiness.

Ukraine retained a mass mobilisation structure—divisional in scale and reliant on Soviet equipment—but lacked practical interoperability, joint command training, or modern logistics. As military historian Phillip Karber noted in 2015, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were “a shell, with little combat experience, few trained NCOs, and no unified battlefield doctrine.”

2014–2016: Shock, Improvisation, and Foundational Change

The annexation of Crimea and the insurgency in Donbas prompted an abrupt rupture in Ukraine’s strategic culture. With a military hollowed out by years of underfunding and political neglect, Ukraine’s response was improvised, reactive, and initially largely decentralised. The doctrine of this period was defined more by necessity than by planning.

Battlefield Example – Ilovaisk (August 2014)

The encirclement and destruction of Ukrainian units near Ilovaisk by regular Russian troops was a doctrinally transformative moment. Ukrainian units, trained for police-style counterinsurgency, were overwhelmed by Russian mechanised and artillery assaults. The catastrophe highlighted the need for doctrinal clarity on more sophisticated military techniques such as force escalation, combined arms defence and operational deception.

In response, Ukraine shifted to a new doctrinal posture with the 2015 edition of her Military Doctrine, which for the first time explicitly named Russia as the main military adversary. It emphasised:

• Deterrence and defence against Russian aggression

  
  

• A shift toward NATO interoperability

  
  

• The need for territorial defence and irregular formations

Drawing from the theories as broad as Mao Zedong and Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine’s grassroots resistance—seen in volunteer battalions like Azov, Aidar, and Donbas—illustrated a “people’s war” model: decentralised, ideologically driven and terrain-sensitive.

2016–2021: Systemic Reform and Strategic Westernisation

This period was marked by systemic doctrinal reform, underpinned by NATO-standardisation and the need to shift from defensive improvisation to long-term deterrence.

The Strategic Defence Bulletin of 2016 and the National Security Strategy of 2020 called for:

• Modular brigade structures

  
  

• Professionalisation of the NCO corps

  
  

• Joint operations capability

  
  

• Enhanced air defence and cyber operations

Battlefield Example – Battle of Avdiivka (2017)

This battle marked a turning point in Ukraine’s command maturity. Units from the 72nd Mechanised Brigade and volunteer components successfully coordinated artillery and infantry in a defensive posture that prevented Russian-backed separatists from advancing. The operation showed improvements in command-and-control, counter-battery fire and inter-unit coordination, laying the groundwork for future doctrine around operational coherence.

From a theoretical lens, the work of Martin van Creveld—especially his analysis of command in war—helped frame Ukraine’s emphasis on devolved decision-making and adaptable battlefield leadership. Ukraine was shifting towards a mission command philosophy: command objectives were clear, but tactical execution was delegated downward.

NATO’s influence also grew during this period through Operation ORBITAL (United Kingdom), JMTG-U (United States) and joint exercises like Rapid Trident, which infused the Ukrainian military with Western training in logistics, leadership and civil-military planning.

2022–2025: Full-Scale Invasion and Total War Doctrine

The full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 represented not only a strategic shock but also a doctrinal crucible. Ukrainian forces had to implement all prior reforms in real-time and innovate further. What emerged was a doctrine rooted in total defence, adaptive command and multi-domain warfare.

Battlefield Example – Kyiv Counteroffensive (February–April 2022)

Russia’s attempted encirclement of Kyiv was repelled not only by raw courage but by doctrinal clarity. Ukrainian troops used defence in depth (seeking to delay rather than prevent the advance of the attacker, buying time and causing increased casualties), strategic mobility, urban warfare tactics and localised initiative to harass Russian logistics, sever supply lines and isolate armoured spearheads. Civilian resistance and information dominance amplified the psychological pressure on Russian troops.

Battlefield Example – Kharkiv Offensive (September 2022)

Perhaps the most doctrinally sophisticated operation of the war, the lightning liberation of Kharkiv Oblast showcased Ukrainian mastery of operational deception, manoeuvre warfare and information operations. Ukrainian forces feinted toward Kherson before exploiting weak Russian lines in Kharkiv. The operation is now studied as a classic example of multi-axis surprise, a tenet emphasised by theorists like Basil Liddell Hart, who championed the “indirect approach”.

Key Doctrinal Developments

• Territorial Defence Forces (TDF): A reserve structure drawing on Sweden’s “Total Defence” model, integrating civilians into security infrastructure.

  
  

• Drone-centric warfare: Ukraine has adapted small drones for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), tactical strikes and sea-based raids in the Black Sea.

  
  

• Cyber and information warfare: With support from Western technology firms and civil society, Ukraine pioneered doctrines combining cyber defence, disinformation disruption and narrative control.

Drawing from David Kilcullen’s concept of “accidental guerrilla syndrome”, Ukraine now balances regular warfare with irregular disruption in occupied territories—blending 21st-century technology with insurgent tactics.

Outlook: The Postwar Strategic Doctrine

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s doctrine will likely evolve toward three pillars:

1. Deterrence through modernisation – including air superiority assets (F-16s), long-range strike systems, and layered air defence.

   
   

2. Strategic depth and domestic production – to avoid dependency on fragile supply chains, especially in munitions and drones.

   
   

3. Interoperability and deterrence-by-denial – building on NATO principles, including integrated air-land battle strategies and joint force readiness.

Ukraine’s doctrinal trajectory increasingly mirrors Clausewitzian realism, where war is both a political instrument and a reflection of national will. At the same time, it incorporates Fourth Generation Warfare concepts—especially the dissolution of boundaries between civilian and combatant, cyber and kinetic, state and non-state actors.

Conclusion

Since 2014 Ukraine’s military doctrine has evolved from a post-Soviet relic into a dynamic, adaptive and war-hardened system. Through the crucible of conflict, battlefield innovation and deepening ties with NATO and Western partners, Ukraine has rewritten the manual on national defence under pressure. Informed by battlefield realities and strategic theory alike, Ukraine’s doctrine is no longer merely a defensive script; it is a living expression of a nation fighting not only to survive, but to define its own future.

---

General Works on Ukrainian Military Transformation

• Karber, Phillip A. – “Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014–2015)”, Potomac Foundation, 2015.

  A seminal analysis by a US defence scholar based on field visits to Ukraine, with a focus on the initial doctrinal and battlefield failures and adaptations.

• Kofman, Michael & Migdalovitz, Matthew. – “Russia’s Military Operations in Ukraine and the Evolution of Warfare”, Center for Naval Analyses, 2017.

  Offers context on how Ukraine adapted its doctrine in response to Russian hybrid and conventional threats.

• Tsygankov, Andrei. – Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States (Polity, 2023).

  Although focused on political divergence, this book includes several chapters discussing military developments and strategic thinking.

Official Ukrainian Doctrinal and Strategic Documents

• Military Doctrine of Ukraine (2015)

  [Available in English translation via Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence or NATO Liaison Office]

  – First doctrine to officially name Russia as the main threat.

• Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine (2016)

  – Sets out the roadmap for NATO interoperability and military modernisation.

• National Security Strategy of Ukraine (2020)

  – A broader articulation of security threats and goals, including hybrid warfare, cyber warfare and defence industrial base development.

• Law of Ukraine on the Fundamentals of National Resistance (2021)

  – The legal foundation for the Territorial Defence Forces and resistance doctrine.

Tactical and Operational Case Studies

• ISW (Institute for the Study of War) – Regular battlefield updates and assessments:

  • “Ukrainian Counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson: Lessons in Operational Surprise”

  • “Ukraine’s Defense of Kyiv: Tactical Resilience and Strategic Communication”

• RAND Corporation –

  “Ukraine’s Military Force Structure: Toward NATO Standards and Beyond”, 2022.

  A report on how Ukrainian reforms have impacted force design and command systems.

• NATO Defence College –

  “The Ukrainian Way of War”, 2023.

  Discusses hybrid adaptation and the fusion of irregular and conventional tactics.

Ukrainian and International Voices

• Oleksiy Melnyk (Razumkov Centre, Kyiv) –

  Regular author of analyses on Ukrainian defence reform and threat assessments.

• Mykhailo Zabrodskyi (Lt. Gen., Ukrainian Army) –

  Frequent contributor to joint publications with Western analysts, including the RUSI report “Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine”.

• Military Balance (IISS Annual Reports)

  – Offers year-by-year force composition and doctrinal summaries for Ukraine.

Online Sources and Reports

• Mil.in.ua – Ukraine’s independent military news platform (Ukrainian/English)

• Defense Express – Focused on Ukraine’s defence-industrial sector and military innovations

• Ukrainian MoD White Papers and Press Releases – Regularly feature doctrinal updates