Europe’s return to the drill

Thursday 10 February 2026

For much of the past decade Europe’s energy debate was framed as a moral contest: hydrocarbons were yesterday’s problem and the future belonged to wind, solar and electrification. The shock of 2022 did not repeal that logic, but it did expose how quickly slogans melt when households cannot pay their bills and factories cannot plan their costs. What is now emerging, across several corners of the continent, is a pragmatic, sometimes awkward recalibration: renewed oil and gas exploration plans, justified not as a romance with fossil fuels but as an attempt to forge an energy policy that is independent, reliable and less exposed to coercion.

This does not mean Europe has abandoned decarbonisation. The institutions of the European Union remain committed to net zero by mid century and to large-scale renewable investment. But the political mood has shifted from purity to resilience. Independence is being defined less as total disengagement from hydrocarbons and more as the capacity to choose suppliers, manage risk and avoid the strategic humiliation of dependency.

Independence, after dependency

The European Union has made formal energy independence from Russia a strategic objective since the invasion of Ukraine, with successive measures under the REPowerEU banner and, more recently, political commitments aimed at ending Russian gas imports.    That policy has had two immediate consequences.

First, Europe has imported more liquefied natural gas (LNG), particularly from the United States and Qatar, and has reconfigured pipelines and storage to move gas to where it is needed. The physical system has adapted faster than many expected, but at a price: LNG competes in a global market, its cargoes are mobile and its price is often set by events far from Europe. Second, governments have rediscovered a very old truth. Energy security is a geographical problem before it is an ideological one. If supply is fragile, politics will follow.

In that context, “independent energy policy” is no longer simply a statement about renewables. It is an argument about optionality: having more than one route to heat homes, power industry and keep the grid stable when the wind drops, the sun sets, or a cable is sabotaged.

The new exploration politics

The North Sea: managing decline, not proclaiming victory

In the North Sea the debate is increasingly about how to manage decline without turning it into a sudden collapse of skills, infrastructure and tax base. Britain’s regulator continues to run licensing rounds and has awarded licences in recent years, even as policy evolves towards a “managed transition” that, in the political language of the day, seeks to prevent disorder and protect employment. The point is not that Britain imagines she can drill her way to cheap energy, but that an abrupt contraction can leave the country importing more hydrocarbons, at higher carbon intensity, while losing domestic industrial capacity.

This is the recurring European paradox. If demand cannot be reduced quickly enough, ending supply at home can simply shift extraction abroad, whilst forfeiting control over standards, emissions and security of supply.

Norway: the continental shelf as Europe’s anchor supplier

If there is a single state whose decisions will shape Europe’s medium-term gas balance, it is Norway. She is not a member of the European Union, but she is one of Europe’s most important gas suppliers and she continues to issue new production licences on her continental shelf. In January 2026 the Norwegian authorities offered interests in dozens of production licences under the Awards in Predefined Areas process, a routine that signals continuity rather than retreat. 

The political rationale is straightforward: if Europe wants to reduce the strategic leverage of hostile suppliers, then gas from a stable, proximate, rules-based partner is preferable to a return to dependency or an ever deeper reliance on seaborne LNG cargoes.

The eastern Mediterranean: exploration as sovereignty language

In the eastern Mediterranean, renewed exploration talk has an additional flavour: sovereignty. Greece, Italy and Cyprus have all, in different ways, reopened or intensified discussion of exploration as a means of reducing exposure to external suppliers and anchoring regional influence. Here exploration is not merely an energy issue. It is also a maritime and diplomatic instrument, intersecting with contested sea zones, pipeline diplomacy and the politics of alliance.

France: the return of “energy sovereignty” as a legislative argument

Perhaps the clearest sign of the shifting European climate is rhetorical. France, long proud of her climate leadership, has seen parliamentary momentum behind renewed exploration in overseas territories, explicitly justified in the language of energy sovereignty and security. In late January 2026, France’s Senate approved a proposal to allow oil and gas exploration in overseas territories despite government opposition, illustrating how the political centre of gravity is moving under pressure of geopolitical and cost realities. 

The other half of the story: Europe is also closing fields

Renewed exploration is only part of the European picture. Other decisions cut in the opposite direction, driven by domestic politics, environmental commitments and the social consequences of extraction.

The Netherlands’ Groningen field, once a pillar of European gas supply, has been permanently closed by law, with the shutdown driven by earthquake risk and public anger at damage to homes and communities. Denmark, likewise, has pursued a policy path that ends new exploration licensing as part of a longer phase-out of extraction. 

These choices matter because they narrow Europe’s domestic supply base at precisely the moment when strategic planners have become wary of external dependence. The result is not a single European policy but a patchwork: some states shutting down for reasons of social licence, others reopening because they fear strategic exposure.

What “energy independence” can realistically mean

There is a seductive but misleading version of “independence” that implies self-sufficiency. Europe, taken as a whole, is unlikely to become self-sufficient in hydrocarbons, and few serious policymakers claim otherwise. Independence in the current European sense is better understood as three things.

First, independence means freedom from political blackmail. That implies diversified supply, strong storage, and the capacity to shift fuels and routes when one supply line is threatened.

Second, it means price resilience. Domestic production does not immunise Europe from global prices but it can reduce exposure at the margin, especially when infrastructure constraints or shipping disruptions amplify market swings.

Third, it means industrial continuity. Europe’s offshore workforce, engineering firms, subsea contractors and safety expertise do not instantly reappear once lost. Some governments now fear that if they allow the hydrocarbon sector to collapse too quickly, they will lose the very skills required for the next phase of energy policy, including carbon storage, hydrogen handling and offshore construction.

The climate problem does not go away

It is important to be honest about the contradiction. Renewed exploration is hard to reconcile with Europe’s climate messaging, and it will be criticised as moral backsliding. Some of that criticism will be warranted. New fields lock in infrastructure and political constituencies. They can also encourage the comforting illusion that the transition can be postponed.

But it is also true that Europe’s transition is not happening on a blank slate. The continent is attempting to decarbonise whilst fighting a major war on her doorstep, coping with sabotage risk, and retooling a power system that was designed for steady baseload generation rather than variable renewables. The European Commission for example continues to emphasise security and system resilience in its offshore energy planning, including protection against physical and cyber threats. That is the strategic setting in which exploration politics has returned.

Where this leaves policy

A coherent independent energy policy, if Europe is serious about it, will probably look less like a manifesto and more like a compromise with engineering reality:

• sustained build-out of renewables and grids, because they reduce import dependence over time

• a managed decline of domestic oil and gas, not a chaotic exit that simply increases imports

• long-term contracts and infrastructure that favour reliable partners over hostile suppliers

• investment in storage, demand reduction and efficiency so that gas becomes a balancing fuel rather than a permanent crutch

Europe is relearning that energy policy is foreign policy. She can aspire to virtue, but she must also plan for coercion, volatility and war. In that environment, renewed exploration is not a triumph of hydrocarbons so much as an admission: independence is expensive, messy and, for now, still partly drilled out of the seabed.