Europe's choices for continuing the war in Ukraine

In an influential new report entitled Europe’s choice: Military and economic scenarios for the War in Ukraine (Corisk Report Series No 12, 2025) by Erlend Bjørtvedt et al, two divergent scenarios are assessed for the continuation and eventual outcome of the war in Ukraine. These scenarios summarise possible trajectories of both military developments and their economic implications — not only for Ukraine, but for Europe as a whole. These options should address how we think about the war now.  

Scenario 1 (“Russian success and negotiated settlement favourable to Moscow”)

• Under this scenario, the Russian Federation would continue a steady albeit gradual advance westwards — potentially reaching the Dnipro River — before coercing a negotiated peace on terms beneficial to Moscow. 

  
  

• Such an outcome would likely compel Ukraine to accept a settlement that constrains her political and economic alignment, effectively limiting its prospects for integration into Western institutions such as the European Union or NATO. 

  
  

• For Europe, the report estimates that this outcome will impose substantial costs. These costs stem from prolonged instability, security risks on the bloc’s eastern flank, refugee flows, economic disruption, energy and supply-chain shocks, and greater defence burdens for European nations. 

Scenario 2 (“Ukrainian military resurgence and reconquest, leading to a sustainable peace”)

• In this scenario, Ukraine receives sufficient material support and achieves a level of combat capability that allows it not only to halt the Russian advance, but to push back and reclaim occupied territories. The report suggests that this could recreate the dynamic of the 2022 advances, potentially shifting the balance decisively in Ukraine’s favour. 

  
  

• A successful Ukrainian resurgence, according to the authors, could pave the way to a negotiated peace under conditions more favourable to Kyiv and Europe — enabling Ukraine’s political orientation toward Europe and achieving a sustainable security architecture for the continent. 

  
  

• The economic cost for Europe in this scenario is still significant, but according to the report, it would be considerably lower — roughly half — compared with the cost under the Russian-victory trajectory. 

Beyond these scenario narratives, the report also provides detailed estimates of military requirements (equipment, logistics, materiel losses), models for calculating materiel attrition especially for Russian forces, and a breakdown of what European defence spending and industrial mobilisation would need to look like under each scenario. 

In their political analysis, the authors argue that Europe has not yet formed a coherent, unified strategy to address the war’s long-term consequences — and that this lack of strategic vision increases the likelihood that the conflict’s end might tilt toward the less favourable Scenario 1. 

The report is timely and ambitious. It offers policymakers, analysts and the interested public a clear framework to think through the trade-offs facing Europe: the choice between backing a Ukrainian military resurgence or accommodating a Russian-imposed settlement. The combination of military-technical modelling with macroeconomic cost estimations is a strength, allowing for a holistic view rather than focusing solely on battlefield dynamics.

Nevertheless, several aspects of the report warrant a more sceptical or nuanced interpretation:

• Uncertainty of assumptions: As with any long-term scenario analysis, much depends on assumptions around supply of matériel, rates of attrition, European political resolve, and external factors (e.g. global energy markets, broader geopolitical shifts). The report is explicit that if “both sides’ access to, and utilisation of, resources remain unchanged” the conflict will tend toward the described trajectories. But history of the war has shown that resources — matériel, political will, sanctions regimes — can shift dramatically. Thus the scenarios, while plausible, are not deterministic predictions.

  
  

• Humanitarian and social-cost modelling remains underdeveloped: The report acknowledges the enormous human cost of the war (military casualties, displaced populations, social disruption) though its focus remains on strategic, military, and macroeconomic metrics. Yet for European strategy and moral legitimacy, humanitarian and social costs — internally displaced persons, war trauma, demographic disruption, reconstruction costs — are at least as important as GDP-level economic costs. A scenario-based study that gives more space to these dimensions would be more comprehensive.

  
  

• Risk of “strategy by economics” overshadowing geopolitics: The framing of the war’s outcome in primarily economic and material terms may underplay the complexity of political and societal factors — national identity in Ukraine, the drachmas of morale, international diplomacy, alliance solidarity and nuclear deterrence. For instance a Russian advance to the Dnipro might provoke Western military escalation, or generate mass resistance inside Ukraine — outcomes that defy linear cost-benefit analysis.

  
  

• Possibility of prolonged stalemate or frozen conflict is underexplored: The report outlines two end-state scenarios — a Russian-favoured settlement, or a Ukrainian reconquest leading to peace. It gives less space to a prolonged stalemate, with front lines settling somewhere between current lines and the Dnipro, resulting in indefinite attrition, periodic escalations, and continuing burden for Europe. Given the war’s trajectory so far, such a “frozen conflict” scenario may well be among the most probable — and perhaps the most costly in cumulative humanitarian, economic, and political terms.

  
  

• Challenges for European mobilisation and industrial capacity: The report does discuss what Europe’s defence-industrial effort would need to look like under each scenario.  However, it may understate structural challenges: modernising production, coordinating across many national industries, dealing with supply-chain disruption, political opposition within EU member states to sustained high defence spending. Recent analyses (for example by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy) suggest that Europe will struggle to reach full readiness before 2030 if current trends continue.  This raises doubts over whether even the “Ukrainian success” scenario is realistically deliverable without dramatic, politically difficult mobilisation.

Implications for Europe

The authors of the report argue that Europe is at a strategic crossroads. If European states commit sufficient resources to back Ukrainian military success, they could help secure a favourable peace and long-term stability — potentially avoiding even greater costs over time. Failure to do so, the report suggests, may condemn Europe to a costly, insecure future under the shadow of an emboldened Russia. 

But the scenarios also expose the limits of what can be achieved with economics and matériel alone. Real geopolitics — national will, strategic culture, alliances, domestic politics, and diplomacy — will matter at least as much as tanks and budgets. The report gives only a partial account of these factors.

For Ukraine, the report underscores the need for sustained Western support — not only in matériel, but in a strategic framework that delivers long-term security, reconstruction aid, and integration prospects with Europe. For Europe, it highlights that short-term austerity or political hesitancy may exact a far greater toll over the long run — not only financially, but in strategic autonomy, moral responsibility, and stability.

Europe’s choice may be one of the most useful contemporary efforts to frame the war in Ukraine not just as a Ukrainian problem but as a European problem — one whose resolution will reshape security, economic and political architectures across the continent. Its strength lies in combining military-technical realism with economic pragmatism. For decision-makers, not only in capitals but in European institutions, this is a valuable contribution.

At the same time — and perhaps inevitably — the report should be read as a guide to risks and options, not a prophecy. The real danger is that the neat dichotomy of Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2 becomes a political justification for either disengagement or open-ended war. The possibility of a protracted, grinding conflict, or of a “frozen war” lasting years — with all the human, economic and strategic costs that implies — remains under-emphasised.

In light of recent history, Europe should use this report not as a blueprint, but as a warning: the choice it describes is real, but narrowing the future to only two outcomes may mislead decision-makers. A responsible European strategy would prepare for a range of possibilities — including stalemate — and invest not only in weapons, but in diplomacy, resilience, reconstruction and long-term solidarity with Ukraine.