Europe First: Towards Renewal of an International Rules-Based Order

Friday 10 July 2026

For almost eighty years, the international rules-based order rested upon a simple bargain. The United States would provide the strategic foundations of global security, guarantee freedom of navigation, underpin international financial institutions and champion an international legal framework within which commerce and diplomacy could flourish. Europe, devastated by the Second World War, would rebuild under that security umbrella while gradually constructing an unprecedented experiment in peaceful integration.

That settlement has now entered a period of profound uncertainty.

The geopolitical assumptions that governed the latter half of the twentieth century are dissolving. The United States remains immensely powerful, yet her domestic politics have become increasingly inward-looking. China has emerged as a global economic and military competitor while openly advocating alternative models of international governance. Russia has demonstrated, through her invasion of Ukraine, that she is willing to reject fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity upon which post-war Europe was constructed.

In this environment, Europe faces a choice. It can continue hoping that others will restore the stability of previous decades, or it can assume responsibility for preserving and renewing the principles upon which that stability depended.

A doctrine that might be described as “Europe First” need not be isolationist, nationalist or protectionist. Properly understood, it is almost the opposite. It is the proposition that Europe should place at the centre of its foreign and security policy the defence of the institutions, norms and legal principles that have enabled peace and prosperity across much of the world since 1945.

Unlike the “America First” movement, which has often implied a narrowing of international commitments, Europe First would require Europe to become more internationally engaged. It would involve greater diplomatic activism, increased military capability, more coherent economic strategy and stronger support for international institutions.

The irony is striking. Europe, once the source of many of history’s most destructive conflicts, may now be uniquely positioned to become the principal custodian of multilateralism.

The European project itself provides evidence that rules can replace power politics. The European Union was built not through conquest but through law. Former enemies accepted common courts, common regulations and common markets because they recognised that legal certainty generates prosperity more reliably than military competition.

This experience has broader significance. International law is often criticised for lacking effective enforcement mechanisms. Yet much domestic law functions because societies voluntarily accept common rules. International law similarly depends upon states recognising that compliance serves their long-term interests even when short-term temptations encourage violation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents perhaps the clearest contemporary assault upon this principle. It is not simply a war over territory. It is a challenge to the proposition that borders may not be altered through force, that sovereign states possess equal legal dignity regardless of military strength and that treaties retain meaning beyond immediate convenience.

Ukraine’s resistance therefore carries significance extending far beyond Eastern Europe. It is a defence of principles upon which countless smaller states depend.

Europe has understood this more clearly than many expected.

Military assistance, financial support, refugee protection and sanctions have demonstrated an unprecedented degree of collective action. Although disagreements inevitably persist, European governments have increasingly recognised that Ukrainian security and European security are inseparable.

Yet sustaining that commitment requires more than emergency measures.

Europe First demands structural reform.

Defence spending must continue increasing, not because Europe seeks confrontation but because deterrence remains indispensable to peace. Diplomatic influence depends ultimately upon credible capabilities. Economic power likewise requires resilience. Energy diversification, secure supply chains, technological innovation and investment in advanced manufacturing have become questions of national security rather than merely commercial policy.

The same applies to democratic resilience.

Foreign disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks and covert political influence exploit the openness of democratic societies. Defending liberal institutions therefore requires modern forms of civic education, digital literacy and institutional transparency. Democracies cannot survive indefinitely if their citizens lose confidence in objective information or in the integrity of public institutions.

Economic policy also deserves reconsideration.

For decades globalisation appeared to promise universal gains. In practice, excessive dependence upon authoritarian suppliers created strategic vulnerabilities. Europe now faces the difficult task of balancing openness with resilience. Complete economic decoupling is neither realistic nor desirable. Nevertheless, critical industries—including semiconductors, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence, defence manufacturing and energy infrastructure—require degrees of strategic autonomy unimaginable only a decade ago.

Such autonomy should not be confused with protectionism.

The objective is not economic nationalism but economic security. Competitive markets remain essential, yet they cannot function effectively when geopolitical rivals deliberately weaponise commercial dependence.

Europe’s demographic challenges present an equally formidable obstacle.

An ageing population, declining birth rates and labour shortages threaten long-term competitiveness. Immigration will almost certainly remain necessary, but successful immigration depends upon effective integration, functioning public services and sustained public confidence. These are practical governance questions rather than ideological slogans.

Climate policy likewise intersects increasingly with geopolitics.

Europe has often led global environmental initiatives. That leadership remains valuable provided environmental objectives complement rather than undermine industrial competitiveness. Energy transition should strengthen strategic independence by reducing reliance upon unstable suppliers while stimulating technological innovation across European industry.

Perhaps the greatest institutional challenge concerns foreign policy coherence.

The European Union remains extraordinarily effective at regulating markets yet frequently struggles to respond rapidly to geopolitical crises. Unanimity requirements sometimes produce paralysis precisely when decisive action becomes essential. Greater flexibility in external policy decision-making may become unavoidable if Europe intends to exercise genuine strategic influence.

Relations with the United States should also evolve.

Europe First does not imply anti-Americanism. On the contrary, the transatlantic alliance remains among the most successful partnerships in modern history. Yet mature alliances require capable partners rather than permanent dependence. A stronger Europe ultimately strengthens NATO by distributing responsibilities more equitably while allowing American policymakers greater flexibility in addressing global challenges.

Nor should Europe define itself primarily in opposition to China.

Constructive economic engagement remains both possible and desirable wherever mutual interests exist. However Europe should approach relations with Beijing from a position of confidence rather than dependence, defending intellectual property, market access, human rights and international maritime law without unnecessary confrontation.

The wider world may increasingly welcome such leadership.

Many middle powers seek neither alignment with authoritarian revisionism nor complete dependence upon any single superpower. They seek predictable rules, reliable institutions and stable commercial relationships. Europe possesses considerable comparative advantages in precisely these fields: respected legal systems, sophisticated diplomacy, regulatory expertise and broad experience of peaceful integration across diverse cultures.

To exercise that influence, however, Europe must first believe in its own political civilisation.

European history contains episodes of colonialism, dictatorship and catastrophic war. Honest recognition of those failures is essential. Yet history also produced constitutional government, independent judiciaries, scientific inquiry, human rights, democratic accountability and international legal institutions that have improved life far beyond Europe’s borders.

Confidence need not become arrogance.

Europe First should therefore be understood neither as a slogan nor as an exercise in continental self-importance. It is instead an acknowledgement that history has presented Europe with responsibilities proportionate to its capabilities.

The rules-based international order will not preserve itself automatically. Institutions endure only when influential states choose to defend them. If previous guarantors become less willing or less able to shoulder that burden alone, others must contribute more.

Europe possesses the economic resources, intellectual capital, diplomatic experience and political traditions necessary to undertake that task. Whether it also possesses the confidence remains the defining strategic question of the coming generation.

The future of the international order may depend less upon restoring the world that existed after 1945 than upon constructing a new equilibrium in which Europe finally accepts that preserving international law is no longer merely an idealistic aspiration. It has become Europe’s foremost strategic interest.