Could the United States successfully defend Taiwan?

Monday 5 January 2026

The question of whether the United States could successfully defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion lies at the intersection of military capability, geography, political resolve and strategic timing. It is not a question that admits of a simple affirmative or negative answer. Rather it turns upon a series of contingencies: the form an invasion would take, the speed and decisiveness of American action, the willingness of allies to participate and the degree to which deterrence has already failed before the first shot is fired.

At present, the balance of probabilities suggests that the United States could make a Chinese invasion extraordinarily costly and might well prevent Beijing from achieving its objectives. Whether this would amount to a clean or decisive defence of Taiwan is a different matter.

Taiwan’s strategic and geographic position

Taiwan is an island fortress by nature. The Taiwan Strait is roughly 130 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and is frequently subject to poor weather, strong currents and heavy seas. Any amphibious crossing would be one of the most complex military operations imaginable, requiring maritime dominance, air superiority and sustained logistical support.

Taiwan’s terrain further complicates invasion. Much of the western coastline suitable for landings is heavily urbanised, while the interior is mountainous and well suited to defence. These features favour the defender, particularly if that defender is forewarned and politically unified.

For the United States, geography cuts both ways. Taiwan is far from the continental United States but close to China. American forces would have to operate at the end of long supply lines, while Chinese forces would be fighting close to home. Yet the island geography also limits the routes of attack, allowing the United States to concentrate naval and air power in a relatively confined battlespace.

Chinese military capabilities and limitations

The People’s Liberation Army has undergone a profound transformation over the past two decades. It now fields a large and modern navy, advanced air forces and a formidable arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles designed to keep American forces at bay. China’s so-called anti-access and area-denial strategy is specifically tailored to deter or delay American intervention in the western Pacific.

However capability does not automatically translate into success. Amphibious invasion remains one of the most difficult military operations in existence. China would need to transport and sustain tens of thousands of troops across contested waters while under attack from Taiwanese and potentially American forces. Even limited disruption could derail the operation.

Moreover. the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major war since 1979. While exercises can simulate conflict, they cannot fully replicate the chaos, uncertainty and attrition of real combat, particularly against a technologically sophisticated adversary.

American military advantages

The United States retains significant qualitative advantages. Its navy remains the most capable in the world, particularly in carrier aviation and submarine warfare. American submarines, in particular, pose a grave threat to Chinese surface vessels and supply lines.

The United States Air Force and Navy operate a networked system of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that would be critical in detecting and striking invasion forces. Precision strike capabilities, combined with experience in joint and coalition warfare, would allow the United States to bring overwhelming firepower to bear if political decisions are taken swiftly.

Yet these advantages are not absolute. Chinese missile forces could inflict serious damage on American bases in Japan and Guam, potentially slowing the initial response. Success would therefore depend on resilience, dispersal and the ability to operate under sustained missile threat.

The role of allies and partners

American defence of Taiwan would almost certainly not be a purely bilateral affair. Japan is central to any plausible defence scenario. American forces operate from Japanese territory, and Japanese sea lanes would be directly threatened by a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. While Tokyo’s political constraints remain significant, Japan’s involvement would greatly enhance American operational capacity.

Other regional actors, such as Australia, would likely contribute intelligence, logistics and maritime support. Even limited participation would complicate Chinese planning and strengthen deterrence.

The absence of allies would not make American defence impossible, but it would render it far more difficult and costly. Coalition warfare remains one of Washington’s greatest strategic assets.

Political will and escalation risks

Perhaps the most uncertain variable is political resolve. The United States maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, designed to deter both Chinese aggression and Taiwanese declarations of independence. In a crisis, ambiguity would give way to urgent political decision-making under immense pressure.

Defending Taiwan would entail the risk of major power war, with attendant economic disruption and the possibility of escalation beyond the conventional domain. China might seek to coerce the United States through cyber operations, space warfare or economic retaliation, while Washington would have to decide how far it is willing to go to preserve the island’s de facto autonomy.

Nuclear escalation remains unlikely but cannot be entirely discounted, particularly if either side perceives existential stakes.

A conditional conclusion

The United States could plausibly defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, particularly if it acts early, decisively and in concert with regional allies. It possesses the military means to deny China a quick or easy victory and to impose costs that Beijing would find politically and economically painful.

However success would not be guaranteed, nor would it come cheaply. The outcome would depend less on abstract military balance sheets than on timing, political cohesion and the credibility of deterrence before conflict begins. The most important measure of American success may therefore be that the question is never put to the test at all.