Can war crime indictee Putin travel to Hungary?

On Thursday 16 October 2025 US President Donald Trump received a telephone call from Russian President Vladimir Putin who apparently suggested, the day before President Trump's meeting with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, that the two men have a summit in Budapest, Hungary. By all accounts the US President responded favourably. That presents an immediate issue. Vladimir Putin is indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), to which Hungary and all her neigbours are signatories. Is Hungary obliged to arrest Mr Putin immediately upon arrival, and are her neighbours even permitted to allow him flight over their airspace without intercepting the flight and arresting him? One recent similar example exists, which was France allowing another ICC indictee, Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, overfly French airspace on his way to the United States.

Framework: What the Rome Statute says about state cooperation and arrests

To assess whether a State that is party to the Rome Statute must refuse overflight (or must detain a plane in transit) of an ICC indictee, the relevant provisions are primarily in Part 9 (International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance) of the Statute, read together with general principles (immunities, treaty interpretation, customary international law). Key provisions include:

• Article 86: Each State Party shall “cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 

  
  

• Article 89 (Execution of requests to arrest and surrender) (especially Articles 89(1)–(4)): A State Party which receives a request for surrender must comply “in accordance with the provisions of the Statute” and its national law. 

  
  

• Article 59 (Arrest proceedings in the custodial State): If a State Party receives a request for provisional arrest or arrest/surrender, it must “immediately take the necessary steps” in accordance with law. 

  
  

• The Statute distinguishes “transit in respect of transport by air” (Article 91) and “transit or transport of persons by air” (see especially Article 91(4)(d)) — notably, the text says that “No authorization is required if the person is transported by air and no landing is scheduled on the territory of the transit State”. 

  
  

• But also, if an unscheduled landing occurs, the State may require a transit request from the Court and must detain the person until the request is received (but limited to 96 hours unless the request arrives). 

So in abstract, the Statute contemplates that flights carrying an indictee may transit (even overflights) without the transit State needing explicit authorisation so long as no landing is scheduled. That suggests a textual carve-out: transit (mere overflight) with no landing might not trigger an arrest duty in all circumstances.

However that textual baseline, itself not a model of clarity, must be read in conjunction with the general obligations to cooperate and surrender, and with the practical and interpretive tensions that arise when a high-level official (e.g. head of government) is involved, or when immunities are invoked.

Core interpretive tensions and lines of argument

When one pushes the “flight over airspace” scenario to the edge (e.g. Netanyahu flying over France, or Trump proposing that Putin fly to Budapest), several tensions and counterarguments arise. Below are the key interpretive questions and competing arguments.

1. The “no landing scheduled” clause versus broader arrest duty

Pro (obligation to refuse or detain):

• One might argue that the “no authorization required” clause for overflight (Article 91(4)(d)) is a limited exception, not a blanket immunity. A State might still have an overriding obligation under Article 86/89/59 to arrest an indictee passing through her territory (including overflights) unless the specific textual exception strictly applies.

  
  

• The overflight clause might be interpreted as a logistical facilitation of transport of indictees from one State to another (say, between transfer airports) under ICC-prescribed procedures, not to justify free movement of indictees through a member state's airspace without any arrest consequence.

  
  

• Moreover States are generally under a positive obligation to “cooperate fully” (Article 86) with the Court, and the obligation to surrender an indictee is part of that. Allowing overflight (even without a landing) could be seen as undermining the integrity of the arrest warrant (i.e. enabling evasion). So a more purposive reading might construe the overflight exception narrowly, especially for high-profile indictees.

Con (no automatic obligation to detain or refuse overflight):

• The literal wording seems to permit overflight (no landing) without prior authorisation; that suggests that the drafters anticipated some level of transit flexibility.

  
  

• If every State were required to screen and prevent overflight of indictees, it could impose severe practical burdens on air navigation, diplomatic travel, and impose sovereignty costs. The Statute may not have intended to demand such across-the-board overflight refusals.

  
  

• A defensive interpretation is that the transit clause is meant to prevent the need for burdensome permission procedures in routine air transport, not to permit tacit violations of arrest warrants.

  
  

• In practice many commentators suggest that air-transit States are not duty-bound to interrupt overflights, unless the indictee lands or unless there is a request. Some legal commentary suggests that the “overflight” question is unsettled and that States may argue that they need not — in every case — refuse overflight. (See analysis in MiddleEastEye, for instance). 

Thus a State might permissibly allow overflight, as France appears to have done (or claimed to have done) in the Netanyahu case, by relying on that textual provision.

2. Immunities and Article 27 vs Article 98 tension

A central tension in the Statute is between:

• Article 27(2): “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person … shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction …” — i.e. no immunity for indictees under the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction. 

  
  

• Article 98(1): The Court may not request surrender or assistance that would require a State to act in violation of her obligations under international law, including immunities, unless the requesting State obtains a waiver. 

In practice Article 98 is often invoked in cases where the indictee is a foreign official of a non-State-Party, and the State from which surrender is sought claims immunities under customary international law. For example:

• If an indictee holds head-of-state immunity under customary international law (especially from a non-Rome-Statute State), the State receiving a request for arrest might argue that enforcing the arrest would conflict with her customary international law obligations. According to Article 98, the Court should not force the State to violate her international obligations (unless immunity is waived). 

  
  

• Some analysts argue that for non-States-Party, the indictee might retain immunity unless they have expressly consented or waived (or unless a binding UNSC resolution intervenes). 

In the Netanyahu/France scenario:

• Israel is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. Thus Netanyahu is not automatically subject to Rome Statute obligations (e.g. no obligation to surrender). But that does not necessarily shield him from being arrested by a State Party: under Article 27, the indictee’s official position cannot bar the ICC’s jurisdiction.

  
  

• However a State Party might still invoke Article 98 to argue that imposing the arrest or detaining a dignitary would violate their obligations to respect of immunities under customary international law — unless that immunity has been waived. This is a common counterargument in discussions of ICC jurisdiction. 

  
  

• Many analyses of France’s position note precisely that France has tried to claim that Netanyahu enjoys immunity because Israel is a non-party, thereby that the arrest obligation would conflict with customary law obligations (e.g. diplomatic immunities). But critics counter that the Rome Statute’s text (and ICC jurisprudence) rejects immunity in such cases (i.e. Article 27). 

Thus if a State Party wished to refuse overflight or be asked to detain, it might lean heavily on an Article 98-based immunity argument (or domestic law immunities), especially in cases of heads of state or government.

3. Territoriality, sovereignty, and “upon entry” versus overflight

As to the distinction whether the indictee actually enters (physically lands or enters the territory) or merely overflies:

• Many legal analyses treat a State’s obligation to arrest as applying if the indictee is on her territory. Overflight, especially without landing, might be construed as non-entry and thus not triggering the full “on territory” arrest duty.

  
  

• The transit/overflight clause (Article 91) suggests that overflight is a special regime, not equivalent to entering into the State’s territory. So a State may argue that her arrest obligation is only triggered by a landing or entry.

  
  

• But critics might argue that overflight still constitutes the presence of the indictee in the State’s sovereign domain (airspace), and hence the State should not allow “impunity corridors” that defeat arrest warrants.

This is part of the core contested legal space that at some point a Court (domestic or international) will have to decide: is mere overflight “territorial presence” under the Statute’s obligations (or customary international law) or is it something less?

4. State practice, political exigency, and “non-cooperation” as a practical reality

Even assuming the textual and treaty arguments favour a strong arrest duty, the ICC’s enforcement mechanism is weak: it has no ambulance or police force of its own, and depends on State cooperation. 

Thus a State (like France) might choose to “interpret” its obligations in a way that avoids conflict with high-stakes diplomacy or security interests. In practice, some States have already signaled they may not forcibly arrest a head of government or break diplomatic relations. 

Some in the academic sphere warn of a creeping “democratic exception” (i.e. powerful democracies being treated differently) that undermines the legitimacy of the ICC regime. 

Thus a State might tacitly—or explicitly—choose to “grant safe overflight” to an indictee, arguing either (i) the textual overflight exception; (ii) immunity under Article 98/customary law; or (iii) political necessity overriding enforcement.

5. The Budapest / Hungary scenario: cascading constraints

Trump’s hypothetical suggestion (i.e. let Putin fly to Budapest to meet) raises further constraints:

• Hungary is an ICC State Party. So Hungary is bound by the Rome Statute’s cooperation obligations, including arrest and surrender.

  
  

• Moreover to travel to Budapest from Russia any route would typically cross several ICC State Parties (once in Europe, virtually all overflight States are ICC parties). Each overflight State might consider that there is a potential duty to refuse transit or to detain.

  
  

• If overflight States universally refused, then Budapest could become inaccessible without an air corridor through non-ICC states (and none appear to exist; Hungary is a landlocked country).

  
  

• Moreover Hungary’s complicity in facilitating such a flight might itself be challenged as non-cooperation with the Court, because enabling movement of an indictee might be considered a failure to fulfil cooperation (especially for an indictee of the ICC).

Hence the Budapest proposal might run into blockage unless a corridor of non-cooperating states is available — which in much of Central/Eastern Europe is unlikely.

Summary: competing plausible interpretations

Putting these threads together, one can sketch a few possible “interpretive packages” a State might adopt:

1. Maximalist (strict enforcement) interpretation

   
   

   • Overflight exception (no landing) is narrow and does not preclude arrest obligations in all cases (especially for high-level indictees).

     
     

   • A State must refuse overflight or detain the aircraft carrying the indictee, especially where landing is scheduled or the route plausibly could enable impunity.

     
     

   • Article 27’s removal of immunities is controlling; Article 98 cannot trump that removal except in very constrained cases.

     
     

   • In the Budapest/Putin scenario, Hungary and transit states should block overflight or require detention or surrender.

   
   

2. Moderate (pragmatic) interpretation

   
   

   • The overflight exception is respected where strictly applicable (i.e. no landing scheduled, pure transit).

     
     

   • But if the flight is suspicious (e.g. a political visit, meeting), or if the indictee is a head of government and international attention is high, the State may invoke immunities (via Article 98) or refuse cooperation to avoid diplomatic conflict.

     
     

   • Overflight States may decline to act unless a formal ICC request is made or unless domestic law mandates detention.

     
     

   • In the Budapest/Putin case, overflight countries (e.g. Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia, Romania) might tacitly permit overflight subject to safeguards (e.g. conditions). There seem to be no non-ICC air corridors.

   
   

3. Restrictive (politically cautious) interpretation

   
   

   • The overflight exception is broad: pure overflight should not be interrupted or detained, and States need not revoke overflight permissions.

     
     

   • Immunities (customary law) remain relevant, especially for heads of state from non-ICC parties; Article 98 is read broadly to allow refusal.

     
     

   • States may decline to act if doing so would conflict with their international/diplomatic obligations.

     
     

   • In the Budapest/Putin scenario, transit states and Hungary might allow the flight, invoking diplomatic exceptions and refusing to treat the flight as a target of arrest unless issued a formal request that overcomes immunity arguments.

   
   

Which interpretation a given State will adopt may depend heavily on political will, relations with the indictee’s State, diplomatic cost, domestic law, and her view of the ICC’s legitimacy and authority.

However Putin's landing in Hungary, an ICC signatory state, for a meeting, would not be an "overflight" case and Article 27(2) would appear unambiguously to apply; the Russian Head of State is subject to arrest and detention, and surrender to the ICC in The Hague. The only way for this not to take place is for the Courts and law enforcement authorities of Hungary to refuse to comply with the Rome Statute and thereby place Hungary in breach of the ICC's laws, which Hungary has incorporated into her domestic legal system. In those circumstances it seems highly unlikely that Vladimir Putin would board any flight landing in Hungary, no matter how welcoming the Hungarian Prime Minister or the US President might be in favour of his journey.

The Netanyahu / France case

• France has apparently allowed overflight of Netanyahu’s plane (or given permission) despite the ICC arrest warrant. Some French statements suggest they view Netanyahu as enjoying immunity because Israel is not a party, and that the overflight exception means they need not interfere. Critics (including human rights NGOs) have accused France of violating her ICC obligations. 

  
  

• The French government, as commentators note, has engaged in legal acrobatics—claiming “legal complexity”, invoking Israel’s non-membership, and possibly subordinating her ICC duty to diplomatic considerations. 

  
  

• Observers (e.g. UN special rapporteurs) have criticised these overflights as non-cooperation with the ICC. 

  
  

• Some legal commentators argue that, under a strict reading of the Rome Statute, France should have refused or detained Netanyahu’s flight (or revoked overflight permission). 

Hence the French example demonstrates the tension between a legal obligation (as some interpret it) and political/diplomatic manoeuvring.

Concluding reflections

• The Rome Statute’s text does provide a special overflight exception (no authorisation required if no landing is scheduled), which gives breathing room to States to argue they need not refuse overflight in all cases.

  
  

• But that textual exception is unclear; one could read it narrowly (intended only for incidental ICC-related transport), so as not to allow free movement of indictees. To read it broadly places it in direct conflict with the overriding obligation to cooperate with the ICC under Article 98.

  
  

• Immunities—especially for heads of state or government from non-State-Party States—remain a core flashpoint, invoked through a conflict between Article 98 and customary international law.

  
  

• Ultimately enforcement depends heavily on State political will, as the ICC lacks its own coercive enforcement powers.

  
  

• The Netanyahu/France case and the hypothetical Trump/Putin scenario epitomise the tension between treaty-based obligations and Realpolitik, and they underscore how much discretion States still enjoy (or claim) when balancing ICC cooperation against national diplomacy.

  
  

• Nevertheless the risks involved for the President of Russia render it unlikely that he will be having a meeting with US President Trump or anyone else in Hungary in the near future.