Brave but Tired: Ukraine’s Armed Forces in Year Four of Full-Scale War

In war, courage is not always enough. It is required, certainly—sacred, even—but by the fourth year of attritional, high-intensity combat, it begins to meet its limits. The Ukrainian Armed Forces remain among the most determined, disciplined and adaptive militaries in the world. But they are also exhausted. Their ranks have endured relentless pressure: human, logistical, psychological and political.

Ukraine has defied every forecast. She held Kyiv, liberated Kharkiv and Kherson, and turned trench networks in Donetsk into bulwarks of national resistance. But victory is proving elusive, and the line of contact from Kupiansk to Orikhiv has frozen into a grinding war of attrition. The battle is no longer one of manoeuvre, but of endurance.

We now survey the current state of Ukraine’s Armed Forces (UAF) in the fourth year of full-scale war: their strengths, their structural weaknesses, and the strategic reforms required to maintain effectiveness as the war enters a long twilight.

The Professionalisation of Necessity

When Russia invaded in February 2022, Ukraine was already at war, albeit on a lower intensity scale since 2014. Nevertheless the transformation from a 250,000-person army into a nationwide war machine was staggering.

Ukraine rapidly mobilised more than one million men and women into active and reserve formations. Territorial Defence Forces were stood up in every oblast. Veterans returned. Civilians became soldiers. Technology entrepreneurs became drone engineers. A decentralised command culture evolved from battlefield necessity, inverting Soviet legacy models in favour of frontline initiative.

Western training missions—particularly by the United Kingdom, Poland, Canada and the United States—helped modernise leadership, small unit tactics, and artillery coordination. Combat experience accumulated quickly, and with it came institutional agility.

By mid-2023, Ukraine had become one of the most capable militaries in Europe. But this capability came at a price: high casualty rates, incomplete rotation, and the slow erosion of strategic stamina.

Attrition and the Manpower Challenge

In the second half of 2025, Ukraine’s greatest military vulnerability is not morale or equipment. It is people.

• Casualties, though closely guarded by the Ukrainian government, are estimated in the tens of thousands dead and hundreds of thousands wounded. Many of the most experienced assault troops were lost during the Bakhmut and Avdiivka campaigns.

  
  

• Mobilisation fatigue is setting in. Public support for the war remains high, but willingness to enlist voluntarily has declined. Legislative reforms in spring 2025 introduced tighter conscription rules, but implementation has proven socially and politically sensitive.

  
  

• Age and physical condition of new recruits are often below optimal thresholds. Many are in their 40s or older, with limited prior military experience.

  
  

• Rotation and rest cycles are irregular. Some brigades have remained in contact for over a year with minimal relief.

This manpower strain is compounded by a shortage of experienced junior officers and NCOs. Many leaders at company and platoon level have been lost or burned out. Training replacements takes time—something the battlefield rarely permits.

Strategic Adaptation Under Pressure

Despite these pressures, the UAF continues to innovate. Ukrainian forces have adapted to persistent Russian advantages in mass and artillery by exploiting:

• Drone warfare: FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, and naval drones have become the backbone of Ukraine’s asymmetric advantage.

  
  

• Precision fires: HIMARS, Storm Shadow, and other long-range strike systems allow deep interdiction of Russian logistics—although the supply of munitions remains inconsistent.

  
  

• Engineering and fortification: The “Surovikin Line” built by Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia has now been met by Ukraine’s own layered defence systems in the east and northeast.

  
  

• Electronic warfare: Ukraine has developed robust EW capacities, especially in drone signal interception, though Russian jamming has also become more sophisticated.

  
  

• Civil-military integration: Ukraine’s tech sector and civil society remain deeply embedded in defence innovation—from battlefield AI applications to 3D printing of vehicle components.

The Surovikin Line, a series of defensive fortifications in Russian-occupied Ukraine designed to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces cutting off occupied Crimea from mainland Russia via a push in the direction of Melitopol in occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast.

What Ukraine lacks in quantity, she continues to make up for in ingenuity. But ingenuity cannot substitute for reserves.

The Logistics Gap: Western Aid and Its Limits

Ukrainian operational tempo is shaped not just by willpower, but by the timing and volume of Western deliveries. In 2023–24, Ukraine suffered from severe shortages of:

• 155mm artillery shells

• Air defence missiles (particularly for Patriot and NASAMS systems)

• Spare parts for NATO-standard vehicles

• Consistent fuel and lubricant supplies

• Drone components restricted by export controls

Delays in US aid during political wrangling in Washington, and overstretched European production lines, have imposed operational constraints.

The result has been strategic improvisation. The UAF has learned to ration fire missions, repair equipment in-country, and use modified commercial drones to replace purpose-built platforms. But this economy of war cannot be sustained indefinitely.

A modern army cannot run on courage alone. It runs on ammunition, rest, and time.

Morale: Resilient but Strained

Morale within the Armed Forces remains remarkable given the conditions. Soldiers believe in the mission, and public support is unwavering. But psychological strain is mounting:

• PTSD rates are rising, although mental health services are under-resourced.

• Unit cohesion is challenged by rapid replacement and inconsistent training cycles.

• Expectations of victory are complicated by slow progress and political uncertainty.

• Family separations, now in their fourth year, weigh heavily on both service members and their loved ones.

Ukrainian soldiers continue to fight because they must. Because the alternative is occupation, atrocity and national erasure. But the war’s emotional toll is beginning to show.

The military is brave. But the military is tired.

What Must Come Next

Ukraine’s Armed Forces are holding. But they must now transition from improvisation to institutionalisation. This requires:

1. Manpower reform: A stable, transparent and fair mobilisation system, with appropriate exemptions, rotations and incentives.

   
   

2. NCO development: Invest heavily in sergeant-level leadership—crucial for cohesion and battlefield efficiency.

   
   

3. Sustainable logistics: Shift from Western emergency aid to integrated defence-industrial cooperation.

   
   

4. Mental health infrastructure: Normalise psychological support as part of military service, not its aftermath.

   
   

5. Strategic clarity: Define realistic operational goals, communicate them clearly, and avoid overextension for symbolic gains.

If the war continues—as all signs suggest it will—then Ukraine must prepare for a second wave of defence building. This is one not driven by desperation, but by long-term strategic design.

Still Standing

In year four, the Ukrainian Armed Forces remain intact, professional and motivated. They have held back a larger, better-resourced invader through discipline, creativity and sacrifice. But they are under strain—visible, audible, human.

The West must see this not as weakness, but as warning. Ukraine’s resilience is not infinite. Without reinforcement—material, structural, psychological—it may fray.

The story of this war is not over. But the next chapters will be harder. To endure them, Ukraine’s defenders need more than medals and slogans. They need systems. They need rest. And they need the world to understand that staying brave must not mean staying alone.