Black Sea Chessboard: Ukraine, Turkey, and the Future of Maritime Security

The Black Sea has long been central to regional rivalries, shifting alliances and maritime ambition. In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has taken on an even more critical strategic significance. At the centre of this increasingly contested maritime space stand Ukraine and Türkiye—two nations whose histories, security imperatives, and maritime strategies are converging with both opportunity and tension. As Ukraine seeks to redefine her naval posture after suffering grievous losses, and Turkey aims to maintain her pivotal role as NATO’s southeastern bulwark, the future of maritime security in the Black Sea will depend upon their coordination, their shared threats, and the capacity of regional and international frameworks to contain an increasingly volatile situation.

Ukraine’s Naval Rebirth

The collapse of Ukraine’s navy during the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea was a watershed moment. Sevastopol—Ukraine’s primary naval base—fell without a fight, and with it, more than half of the Ukrainian fleet was either captured or scuttled. Since then, Ukraine has embarked on the painful task of rebuilding her naval capacity, albeit from a standing start and under constant threat. The 2022 invasion made it clear that sea control and denial would become essential components of Ukrainian defence and economic survival.

Despite her disadvantages, Ukraine has achieved asymmetric success at sea. Her use of maritime drones and precision strikes has forced the once-dominant Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw much of its presence from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, upstream Russian rivers. Ukraine’s strike on the flagship Moskva on 14 April 2022, and repeated attacks on Russian naval infrastructure and logistics chains, demonstrated a capacity to innovate and adapt. With British, American and Turkish support, Ukraine has begun to build a “mosquito fleet” of small, agile vessels that can operate under the umbrella of coastal missile systems. Ukraine’s geography does not permit the projection of large-scale naval power, but it does allow for a highly effective sea-denial strategy.

Türkiye: The Strategic Gatekeeper

Türkiye has long considered herself the guardian of the Black Sea straits. Under the Montreux Convention of 1936, she controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, allowing her to limit the presence of non-Black Sea naval powers. Since February 2022, Ankara has used this legal instrument to prevent the entry of warships into the Black Sea, including those of her NATO allies, thereby limiting escalation but also constraining Ukraine’s maritime support options.

Yet Türkiye’s position is more complex than that of a neutral broker. Ankara’s relations with Moscow are characterised by pragmatic cooperation and latent rivalry. While Türkiye has sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine and supported some NATO initiatives, she has also maintained economic ties with Russia, particularly in energy and grain. Türkiye’s Black Sea policy is therefore a balancing act: she seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Russia while reinforcing her own role as a regional power and maintaining cordial ties with Ukraine.

Security Architectures and Strategic Cooperation

Maritime security in the Black Sea is governed less by formal alliances than by webs of bilateral arrangements and strategic understandings. NATO’s role is limited: under the Montreux Convention, only Black Sea states may maintain warships in the sea beyond 21 days, and NATO’s major non-littoral navies—such as the US and UK—have only episodic presence. Romania and Bulgaria, both NATO members, offer staging points for maritime surveillance and air patrols, but they lack significant naval power.

In this context, Ukraine and Türkiye are forging quiet partnerships. The Ukrainian Navy has trained with the Turkish Navy and received equipment and shipbuilding support from Turkish yards. In 2021, the two countries signed a defence agreement for the joint construction of corvettes and unmanned aerial systems. The continuation of such collaboration will be essential if Ukraine is to maintain a credible naval deterrent.

At the same time, both countries share concern about the Russian militarisation of Crimea and Moscow’s use of the Black Sea Fleet to project power into the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Russia’s repeated use of sea mines, attacks on grain convoys, and blockade tactics have alarmed Ankara, which sees the disruption of Black Sea trade as a threat to regional stability and to Turkish interests in maintaining her role as a transport and grain hub.

Grain Corridors and Economic Security

Nowhere is maritime cooperation between Türkiye and Ukraine more visible than in the negotiation of grain export corridors. After Russia suspended participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative in mid-2023, Türkiye played a central role in brokering alternative corridors through her territorial waters, allowing Ukrainian grain to reach world markets via Romania and Bulgaria. These routes, though longer and more complex, underscored the potential of regional coordination even without formal Russian participation.

Türkiye’s strategic interest in keeping food and energy flows unimpeded aligns with Ukraine’s need to sustain her agricultural economy. This convergence has created opportunities for diplomatic innovation, even in the shadow of war. Ankara’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-aggression, if selectively applied, nonetheless gives her moral and political space to support Ukrainian economic survival.

Challenges Ahead

The future of Black Sea security is riddled with uncertainty. The war in Ukraine shows no sign of resolution, and Russia’s willingness to target civilian and economic infrastructure, including ports and shipping, suggests that maritime tensions will remain high. Ukraine’s long-term naval prospects depend upon continued Western support, integration of drone and missile technologies, and strategic partnerships—particularly with Türkiye.

For Türkiye, the challenge is to remain a credible power-broker without being drawn into direct confrontation. Ankara’s recent overtures toward the European Union and reset of relations with NATO suggest she may lean more decisively westward—particularly if Russia’s fortunes continue to decline.

Yet the broader question remains: can the Black Sea be stabilised without a new security architecture that includes not only NATO, but Ukraine as a full participant? Until then, the region will remain a chessboard—one in which the game has already begun, but for which the endgame is far from clear.