Assessing the current status of Russia's nuclear arsenal

Russia possesses the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear warheads, but the actual operational capability of its arsenal is a subject of debate. While Russia officially claims to have thousands of nuclear weapons at its disposal, the maintenance, modernisation, and reliability of these warheads and their delivery systems raise questions about the country’s true nuclear strength. Here we examine the composition, maintenance, and strategic viability of Russia’s nuclear arsenal in light of its aging infrastructure, modern advancements, and the impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Composition of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal

Russia’s nuclear arsenal consists of two main categories: strategic nuclear warheads and tactical (non-strategic) nuclear warheads.

1. Strategic Nuclear Warheads: These are designed for long-range deterrence and are deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Russia currently has approximately 5,580 nuclear warheads, of which about 1,674 are deployed and operational. The strategic arsenal is governed by treaties such as the New START Treaty, which limits deployed warheads and launchers.

   
   

2. Tactical (Non-Strategic) Nuclear Warheads: Russia is believed to possess around 1,558 operational tactical nuclear warheads, which are designed for battlefield use. These warheads can be delivered by aircraft, short-range missiles, and artillery systems. Unlike strategic weapons, these are not covered under existing arms control agreements, making their exact numbers difficult to verify.

   
   

Believed locations of Russian nuclear weapons in 2012

Delivery Systems

Russia relies on a combination of legacy Soviet-era systems and modernised platforms for her nuclear delivery. The key categories include:

1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs):

   
   

   • RS-24 Yars (modernised, road-mobile and silo-based, MIRVed)

     
     

   • R-36M2 Voevoda (Soviet-era, heavy ICBM, ageing but still operational)

     
     

   • Topol-M (mobile and silo-based, ageing but still in use)

     
     

   • Sarmat (new heavy ICBM, replacing Voevoda, still in early deployment phase)

     
     

2. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs):

   
   

   • RSM-56 Bulava (newer missile, deployed on Borei-class submarines)

     
     

   • R-29RMU2 Layner and Sineva (deployed on older Delta IV-class submarines)

     
     

   • Russian submarine capability has been weakened by Ukraine’s successful targeting of naval assets in the Black Sea, forcing redeployment.

     
     

3. Strategic Bombers:

   
   

   • Tu-160 (modernized supersonic bomber capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles)

     
     

   • Tu-95MS (aging but still used for long-range nuclear missions)

     
     

   • Kh-102 nuclear cruise missiles are the primary air-delivered nuclear option.

     
     

4. Tactical Nuclear Delivery Systems:

   
   

   • Iskander-M ballistic missiles (dual-capable)

     
     

   • Kalibr cruise missiles (potential nuclear capability)

     
     

   • Kinzhal hypersonic missile (air-launched, nuclear-capable but untested in a nuclear role)

     
     

Modernisation versus Ageing Systems

While Russia has been investing in modernising parts of its nuclear triad, much of its arsenal still relies on aging Soviet-era systems. Here are some key points to consider:

• ICBM Aging Issues: Many of Russia’s land-based ICBMs, including the R-36M2 Voevoda and Topol-M, date back to the late Soviet period. Though they remain operational, maintenance challenges increase over time.

  
  

• Naval Challenges: The Borei-class submarines represent a significant modernisation effort, but the overall state of Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet remains a concern, particularly after Ukrainian drone and missile attacks in the Black Sea forced Russia to withdraw key vessels.

  
  

  

  The Borei class Russian submarine with submarine launched ballistic missile capability

• Strategic Bombers: The Tu-160 has been upgraded, but much of Russia’s air-launched nuclear strike capability still depends on the Tu-95MS, an aircraft that first flew in the 1950s.

  
  

• Infrastructure and Reliability Issues: Reports suggest that Russia faces difficulties maintaining its nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles due to financial constraints, corruption, and industrial inefficiencies. The US and NATO intelligence assessments indicate that a significant portion of Russia’s arsenal may not be fully operational.

  
  

Impact of the Ukraine War on Russia’s Nuclear Readiness

The war in Ukraine has exposed weaknesses in Russia’s conventional military capabilities, leading to speculation about its nuclear forces. Key factors include:

• Depleted Missile Stockpiles: Russia has used vast quantities of precision-guided missiles in Ukraine, potentially affecting its strategic reserves.

  
  

• Naval Retreat in the Black Sea: The loss of Sevastopol as a secure naval base for nuclear-capable vessels weakens Russia’s second-strike deterrence.

  
  

• Military-Industrial Struggles: Western sanctions have restricted access to high-tech components necessary for missile guidance and warhead maintenance.

  
  

Comparing Russia’s Arsenal with Other Nuclear Powers

While Russia has the highest number of nuclear warheads, operational reliability must be contrasted with other nuclear states:

• United States: Approximately 5,044 warheads, of which around 1,770 are deployed. US warheads and delivery systems generally have higher reliability due to ongoing maintenance and modernisation programmes.

  
  

• China: Estimated 500 warheads, with a rapidly growing arsenal, modern delivery systems, and no aging Cold War stockpiles.

  
  

• France & UK: Smaller arsenals (~300 warheads for France, ~225 for the UK), but highly reliable SLBM-based deterrents.

  
  

Does Russia Retain a Credible Second-Strike Capability?

Second-strike capability refers to a nation’s ability to retaliate after a nuclear attack. While Russia retains this ability in theory, in practice:

• The reliability of Russia’s ICBMs is in question, given their age and maintenance issues.

  
  

• The survivability of Russia’s strategic submarine fleet has been reduced due to recent attacks and logistical constraints.

  
  

• Russia’s strategic bomber force is highly vulnerable to NATO air defences and lacks the numbers to serve as a decisive deterrent.

  
  

Conclusion

Russia remains one of the world’s leading nuclear powers by sheer warhead count, but her arsenal faces significant challenges. Ageing infrastructure, maintenance difficulties, and the degradation of her delivery systems due to the Ukraine war raise doubts about the credibility of Russia’s nuclear deterrence. While she still possesses a formidable strategic capability, the operational reliability of much of her stockpile remains questionable. In comparison to the United States and emerging nuclear powers like China, Russia’s claim to being the world’s most powerful nuclear state is increasingly fragile. The coming years will determine whether Russia can modernise its arsenal effectively or whether her nuclear superiority is largely an illusion built on outdated Cold War assets.