Armenia and Azerbaijan: Divergent Paths Beyond Soviet Influence

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the South Caucasus has been a region caught between competing poles of influence: the legacy of Russian dominance, the promise of integration with the West, and the gravitational pull of regional powers such as Turkey and Iran. Amongst the three South Caucasus republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan have followed markedly different trajectories, shaped above all by their decades-long conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Today, as Russian influence weakens and Western institutions seek to expand their presence, the two countries appear to be navigating divergent courses out of Moscow’s shadow, albeit under very different pressures and motivations.

Armenia: Disillusion with Russia, Searching for New Partners

For decades after independence, Armenia was Moscow’s most loyal ally in the region. Landlocked and economically vulnerable, she depended heavily on Russian military protection and economic support. Russian troops guarded her borders with Turkey and Iran, and Armenia was a member of both the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union, two Russian proxy institutions.

Yet the wars of 2020 and 2023 over Nagorno-Karabakh exposed the limits of Moscow’s commitments. Despite Armenia’s formal alliance obligations, Russia did little to prevent Azerbaijan’s decisive military victories, enabled in part by Turkish support and advanced drone technology. For many Armenians, this failure was interpreted as betrayal.

As a result, Yerevan under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has increasingly sought to reorient foreign policy. Armenia has deepened ties with the European Union, signing a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement and welcoming EU civilian monitors along her border with Azerbaijan. Relations with the United States have also warmed, as Washington signals greater interest in mediating regional peace. While Armenia is unlikely to sever all ties with Russia in the near future—given economic dependencies and the presence of Russian bases—her trajectory is visibly westward. This shift reflects both strategic necessity and growing public sentiment that Armenia’s survival requires broader partnerships beyond Moscow.

Azerbaijan: Strategic Balancing with a Western Tilt

Azerbaijan’s path has been more complex. Rich in energy resources and geographically positioned as a bridge between Europe and Asia, she has always enjoyed more room for manoeuvre than her Armenian neighbour.

Baku maintained pragmatic ties with Moscow after independence, but never allowed itself to become overly dependent. Instead, Azerbaijan invested in relations with Turkey, her closest ally, and in building energy corridors to Europe. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor have made Azerbaijan a key supplier of hydrocarbons to the EU—particularly important as Europe seeks alternatives to Russian energy.

Azerbaijan’s military victories over Armenia have reinforced her confidence and global visibility. President Ilham Aliyev’s government has used them to strengthen ties with both Ankara and Western capitals. However, Azerbaijan does not present herself as a state intent on fully aligning with the West. She values strategic autonomy, balancing relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the EU. While her energy links to Europe provide leverage, her authoritarian domestic politics and human rights record complicate deeper integration with Western institutions. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan’s role as a critical energy supplier ensures that Western governments will continue to cultivate relations, even as they temper criticism with pragmatism.

Russia’s Waning Grip

The shifts in both Armenia and Azerbaijan are part of a broader regional trend: the gradual erosion of Russian influence. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and subsequent focus on that war have reduced Moscow’s capacity to manage its former peripheries. Russian peacekeepers, deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh after the 2020 war, proved unable to prevent Azerbaijan’s final offensive in 2023, after which Armenia declared that Moscow had failed in its obligations. For Azerbaijan, Russia’s distraction provided an opportunity to consolidate territorial gains.

In both cases, Moscow’s diminished authority has created a vacuum that Western and regional powers are moving to fill. Turkey has been the most active, projecting hard and soft power in Azerbaijan and increasingly positioning itself as a regional arbiter. The European Union has gained influence through energy contracts with Baku and monitoring missions in Armenia. The United States, while less engaged historically, has stepped up its diplomatic role in recent peace negotiations.

Brief Comparison: Georgia’s Parallel Course

Alongside Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia offers a third model of post-Soviet orientation. Tbilisi declared its Western aspirations earlier and more openly than its neighbours, pursuing NATO membership and EU integration almost immediately after independence. Despite internal turbulence and intermittent Russian pressure, Georgia’s political class has generally sustained a Western trajectory, reinforced by popular support. By contrast, Armenia’s westward turn is recent and reactive, driven by disappointment with Moscow, while Azerbaijan pursues a policy of strategic balancing rather than clear alignment. The South Caucasus is therefore united only in its gradual loosening from Russian dominance; its three independent republics diverge in the speed, clarity, and risks of their respective paths.

Prospects for the Future

Armenia and Azerbaijan’s western orientations remain fragile and incomplete. Armenia’s tilt towards the EU and US is constrained by her economic reliance on Russia and geographic vulnerability. The pace of reform and the durability of Western security commitments will be critical in determining how far she can move westward. For Azerbaijan, energy interdependence provides leverage, but her reluctance to democratise and preference for non-alignment means she will likely remain a selective partner rather than a full Western ally.

The long-term challenge for both countries lies in reconciling their strategic goals with their domestic political systems. Armenia’s democratic experiment will be tested by security pressures and economic strains. Azerbaijan’s strongman governance risks alienating Western partners even as it ensures internal stability. Both face the delicate task of managing relations with neighbouring powers—Turkey, Iran, and Russia—while seeking greater integration with Europe and the West.

The bottom line

Armenia and Azerbaijan, once bound together under Soviet rule, are now charting divergent courses out of Moscow’s orbit. Armenia’s growing estrangement from Russia has pushed her closer to Europe and the United States, while Azerbaijan leverages her energy wealth and strategic geography to balance ties but tilt westward. Georgia, already more firmly embedded in Western institutions, underscores how varied the trajectories of the South Caucasus republics have become. Together, these paths illustrate a region in flux, where Russian influence is fading and Western engagement is rising, unevenly but decisively.