Are the Ukrainian Police adequately resourced?

Ukraine’s police now work in circumstances that would overwhelm almost any civilian law-enforcement agency. They must police a society traumatised by large-scale war, manage mass displacement, help to investigate tens of thousands of war crimes and at the same time maintain day-to-day order and respond to ordinary crime. Whether they are adequately resourced, and whether their priorities are well set, can only be judged against this extraordinary context.

Three questions arise. First, what has happened to crime patterns in wartime Ukraine. Secondly, what tasks and priorities have been placed upon the National Police. Thirdly, how far current resources and priorities match the country’s needs.

Crime in wartime Ukraine: lower numbers, more complex risk

Official statistics suggest that recorded crime fell after the full-scale invasion in February 2022, particularly in 2022 and early 2023. Ukraine’s Interior Minister stated in March 2023 that overall crime had declined, while the police had registered about 70,000 alleged Russian war crimes by that point. On the surface, this appears to indicate a safer society than before the war.

However these headline figures hide several important shifts.

First, recorded crime fell partly because millions of people fled abroad or became internally displaced, very large areas were under Russian occupation, and many victims were either unable or unwilling to report offences. Underreporting and loss of state control in occupied territories inevitably depress the statistics.

Secondly, by 2023 and 2024 the composition of crime within government-controlled territory changed. Analytical work based on law-enforcement statistics shows that although the total number of crimes increased modestly, this was driven less by classic war crimes and more by economic and narcotics offences. Compared with 2022, fraud reportedly increased around two and a half times in 2023, drug offences by about 13 per cent, theft by 18 per cent and offences against life and health by nearly 50 per cent. These are precisely the offences that can undermine social cohesion during a drawn-out conflict.

Thirdly, the war has transformed the criminal landscape in qualitative terms. A 2025 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes that organised groups are adapting their business models: displacement and economic hardship have increased trafficking risks, while demand for synthetic narcotics such as methadone has grown. A broader UN study on organised crime dynamics in Ukraine, based on fieldwork between late 2023 and mid-2024, warns that arms proliferation, corruption at border points and vulnerabilities in reconstruction contracts are likely to provide fertile ground for serious organised crime if not actively contained. 

In short, recorded crime has not exploded in numerical terms, yet the pattern of offending has become more complex and more dangerous in the long term. This sets a demanding agenda for the police.

The police under martial law: expanded tasks and shifting priorities

Since February 2022 the National Police and other law enforcement bodies have been placed under martial law conditions. Their priorities reflect both the requirements of national survival and the need to maintain some semblance of normal civilian life.

Several new or expanded tasks stand out.

1. War crimes documentation and investigation.

   
   

   The National Police are central to the documentation of alleged Russian war crimes. By early 2023 they had recorded tens of thousands of such cases. In January 2025 the police presented a dedicated Strategy on the management of investigations into international crimes committed in the conflict, developed with the support of the Council of Europe. High-profile investigations such as the killings on Ivana-Franka Street in Bucha, where the police recently identified specific Russian soldiers from the 76th Guards Air Assault Division as suspects after years of painstaking work, illustrate both the ambition and the complexity of this task.

2. Maintaining order under conditions of attack.

   
   

   Police units perform checkpoint duties, enforce curfews, support evacuations, and manage traffic and crowd control during missile and drone attack alerts. External studies describe how law-enforcement officers in frontline or recently liberated areas must keep a functioning presence despite power cuts, air raids and damaged infrastructure. Recommendations for international donors include providing satellite communication terminals, power banks, vehicles and equipment to sustain basic operations. 

   
   

3. Supporting displaced and vulnerable populations.

   
   

   The war has created millions of internally displaced persons. Police are expected to handle increased risks of trafficking, exploitation, domestic violence and child abuse. UNODC and other organisations highlight the need for safe spaces that combine policing with social and medical services in shelters and public locations, in order to maintain trust and encourage reporting. 

   
   

4. Continuing longer-term reforms.

   
   

   Even during the war Ukraine has pressed ahead with law-enforcement reform, not least because these reforms are bound up with European Union accession. The EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM), which supports the police and other agencies, has had its mandate extended until 2027 and continues to provide training and strategic advice. A White Book of Reforms published in 2025 notes that the European Union has become deeply involved in training police officers and prosecutors and in helping investigate war crimes. The government has also approved a formal Action Plan for law-enforcement reform for 2023 to 2027 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

5. Ordinary policing tasks.

   
   

   Despite the war, the police must still investigate theft, assault, fraud, narcotics offences and road traffic offences, and they must manage public order in cities that attempt to live something resembling a normal life. The National Police have also introduced new tools such as improved data collection for hate crimes, which suggests that some reform agenda items have not been entirely halted by the conflict. 

These tasks stretch a force that was already under scrutiny before the full-scale invasion, particularly for corruption and abuses of power.

Resourcing: where the police are supported, and where they are not

Resourcing has to be understood broadly: personnel, material and communications equipment, training and institutional support, and the psychological resilience of officers.

On the positive side, external partners have helped to prevent institutional collapse. EUAM and other European partners have donated vehicles, protective equipment and technical tools, and they have continued to train Ukrainian officers in areas such as cyber security, war crimes investigations and community policing. International bodies offer specialised support on organised crime and war crimes, while the International Criminal Court and United Nations mechanisms provide frameworks for complex investigations. 

Assessments of Ukraine in various security indexes note that, despite the war, law enforcement agencies continue to operate throughout most of the country. Public trust remains particularly high in the Armed Forces and the National Guard, and although trust in the National Police is lower, the system has not collapsed. Crime statistics are collected and published; police remain visibly present in cities that are under regular attack; and large-scale disorder has been rare in comparison with the intensity of the conflict.

Nevertheless significant gaps are apparent.

1. Manpower and coverage.

   
   

   Many police officers have been mobilised into the armed forces or killed or injured in the line of duty. Others are displaced from occupied territories. Keeping posts open in depopulated or frontline areas is challenging. External studies speak of the need to provide communication equipment, power sources and vehicles simply to keep police stations functioning in areas close to the front.  These difficulties suggest that personnel and material coverage are only just adequate in many districts.

   
   

2. Equipment and technical capacity.

   
   

   War crimes investigations require ballistics, digital forensics, data analysis and international co-operation of a kind that would tax even well resourced Western police forces. The Bucha street massacre investigation, for example, required the correlation of a wide range of data about weapons, ammunition and Russian units. Ukraine has received assistance, yet the sheer scale of more than one hundred thousand alleged war crimes means that investigative capacity is spread thinly and many cases may never be fully processed.

   
   

3. Dealing with economic and cyber crime.

   
   

   The sharp rise in fraud, theft and drug offences since 2022 indicates that criminal actors are exploiting wartime vulnerabilities. International analysis warns of growing cyber fraud and scams linked to humanitarian aid and military procurement, areas that require sophisticated financial investigation and digital skills. These domains have historically been under resourced in Ukraine, and little evidence suggests that they have yet caught up with the new scale of the problem.

   
   

4. Integrity and public trust.

   
   

   Long-standing concerns about corruption in the police have not vanished. Research on Ukrainian policing after 2014’s revolution observed persistent practices such as bribery, failure to investigate high-profile cases and nepotism in appointments. More recent assessments reiterate that confidence in the National Police lags behind trust in the armed forces and highlights worries about abuse of power within civilian law-enforcement structures. While wartime patriotism and shared danger have improved perceptions in some areas, credible allegations of corruption continue to surface. This erodes the effectiveness of the police as a guarantor of justice.

   
   

5. Psychological support for officers.

   
   

   Officers work under intense and prolonged stress, dealing with bombardment, mass casualties and the investigation of atrocities. Policy analysts emphasise the need for structured psychological and psychosocial support within law-enforcement agencies, which is still patchy and donor-driven rather than embedded.  In the long term, untreated trauma amongst officers may increase the risk of misconduct and reduce professional effectiveness.

These factors point to a mixed picture. The police have enough resources to function and to undertake some highly demanding tasks, yet not enough to meet all the demands placed upon them without trade-offs.

Are the priorities right?

It is reasonable that Ukraine’s leadership has made national defence and accountability for Russian war crimes central priorities. The scale of atrocities and the political necessity of documenting them make it inevitable that the police devote substantial resources to these tasks. International partners have also focused support on war crimes documentation and cooperation with international courts. In that sense, the police priorities broadly reflect the national interest.

However there are risks in this emphasis.

First, as war-related tasks expand, routine but socially damaging crime can become neglected. The evident increase in fraud, narcotics offences and violent crime between 2022 and 2023 suggests that these areas have not been fully contained.  Economic crime and corruption, if left insufficiently addressed, will also poison reconstruction and create future political instability.

Secondly, under martial law the boundaries between civilian policing and national security work become blurred. Human rights organisations have documented restrictions on freedom of expression and religion, and have raised concerns about arbitrary detentions and heavy-handed treatment of some suspects, although the main responsibility for the worst abuses lies with Russian forces in occupied territories. There is a danger that, in the name of security, Ukrainian police and security services may tolerate or overlook practices that would be unacceptable in peacetime. Reforms aimed at strengthening internal accountability must not be postponed indefinitely.

Thirdly, community policing and local trust-building risk being overshadowed by militarised functions. Yet in areas far from the front, the everyday legitimacy of the state depends as much upon how the police deal with domestic disputes, road accidents and petty theft as upon their role in national defence. If the police are seen primarily as an arm of national security, their ability to solve local problems may diminish.

That said, some steps suggest that Ukrainian authorities are conscious of these dilemmas. The continuing implementation of an Action Plan on law-enforcement reform, the introduction of improved hate-crime data collection and reforms promoted under the European Union enlargement process all point towards a desire to align Ukrainian policing with European standards, even in wartime. The challenge is one of capacity rather than of principle.

Overall assessment and future needs

The National Police of Ukraine are not adequately resourced in the sense of having everything they need to fulfil all the tasks that have been placed upon them. No police service would be, faced with a war of this intensity. Nevertheless they are sufficiently resourced to avoid collapse, to maintain basic order in most of the country, and to undertake some impressive investigative work on war crimes. In that limited but important sense, they are coping.

Their priorities are broadly understandable. War crimes investigations, support to the armed forces and management of displacement justifiably dominate the agenda. Yet there is a real risk that surging economic crime, narcotics markets, trafficking and corruption will weaken the state from within, even as Ukraine fights an external aggressor. In the medium term, the country’s security will depend as much upon the integrity and effectiveness of its police as upon the performance of her army.

Several conclusions follow.

1. International assistance should continue to prioritise the police, not only the armed forces. This includes vehicles, communications equipment and forensic tools, but also investment in financial investigation, cyber crime units and border policing.

   
   

2. Support for internal integrity systems, professional standards and anti-corruption measures within the police should be intensified. Low trust in the police compared with the army reflects a long history of abuse and must be taken seriously. 

   
   

3. Psychological support for officers should become a routine part of resourcing. Given the nature of the offences they investigate and the conditions in which they work, this is essential if Ukraine is to maintain a professional, humane police service.

   
   

4. Finally, as the war continues, senior leaders must guard against allowing security considerations to permanently overshadow community policing and the protection of everyday rights. The credibility of the Ukrainian state in the eyes of her own citizens, and hence her resilience, depends upon this balance.

Ukraine’s police are admirably resilient but structurally overstretched. Their priorities are largely appropriate to the wartime situation, yet they are forced to leave important areas partially unattended. Adequate resourcing in the deeper sense will mean not simply more money or equipment, but a sustained effort to build a lawful, trusted and modern police service even while artillery still falls.