Algorithms at War: Comparing Ukraine’s GIS Arta and Russia’s Strelets-M Battlefield Systems

As the war in Ukraine moves deeper into its fourth year, the outcome of many engagements increasingly depends not on sheer firepower, but on which side can see, think, and shoot faster. Central to this digital arms race are battlefield management systems — software and hardware ecosystems that allow frontline troops to coordinate strikes, track enemy movements and synchronise actions with devastating speed.

Ukraine’s GIS Arta and Russia’s Strelets-M represent two very different models of such systems. Although both aim to integrate command, control, communications and real-time targeting, their design philosophies, operational usage and battlefield performance reflect the deeper contrasts between Ukraine’s agile, decentralised defence and Russia’s traditionally hierarchical military machine.

Here we compare GIS Arta and Strelets-M, as well as other Russian digital fire control tools, exploring their architecture, performance in the field and implications for the future of digitised warfare — and with a look at where and how they’ve shaped real battles.

GIS Arta: Fast, Open, Adaptive

Developed after 2014 and refined continuously since 2022, GIS Arta is a Ukrainian battlefield geospatial platform that allows real-time artillery coordination based on multiple intelligence inputs. It is designed for speed, modularity, and civilian technology integration — drawing from drone footage, thermal imaging, GPS-tagged mobile apps, and more.

Strelets-M: Secure, Structured, but Slower

By contrast, Strelets-M is part of Russia’s Ratnik soldier modernisation suite. Designed as a rugged, tablet-based fire control and communication device, it functions well under ideal conditions but has proven less flexible under field stress, especially when connectivity is disrupted or command chains collapse.

Field Case Studies

Case Study 1: GIS Arta in the Kherson Counteroffensive (Autumn 2022)

In fall 2022, Ukraine launched its first major counteroffensive in the south, aiming to recapture the strategic city of Kherson. The campaign depended on precision strikes, artillery efficiency and rapid coordination — especially across the Dnipro River, where bridging equipment was scarce and enemy logistics were well dug in.

How GIS Arta was used:

• Drone teams and scouts used GIS Arta-compatible Apps to upload enemy positions in real time.

• Artillery batteries dispersed across Mykolaïv and Kherson oblast were able to receive and fire coordinated missions in minutes — sometimes before Russian units had finished digging in.

• GIS Arta allowed Ukrainian forces to conduct “shoot and scoot” tactics, repositioning after each fire mission based on enemy counter-battery response.

• Damage assessment drones relayed feedback into the system, allowing for immediate recalibration.

“GIS Arta allowed us to fire fewer shells with more results,” one Ukrainian officer told Forbes Ukraine. “It was like having your own eye in the sky — and a brain behind it.”

As a result, Ukraine destroyed dozens of Russian pontoon bridges, ammunition dumps and radar stations, forcing a full Russian withdrawal from Kherson city in November 2022 — the first major strategic victory for Kyiv.

Case Study 2: Strelets-M in the Defense of Svatove-Kreminna Line (Winter 2022–23)

In Luhansk Oblast, Russia sought to defend a key segment of her supply corridor along the Svatove–Kreminna axis. There, Russian forces employed Strelets-M tablets to guide fire missions and coordinate defense in wooded terrain and icy roads.

Reported observations:

• Strelets-M units were used by forward artillery observers to transmit GPS coordinates to mortar and howitzer teams.

• However, reliance on centralised fire approval slowed responses — sometimes delaying counter-battery fire by up to 10–15 minutes, according to intercepted Russian communications.

• Ukrainian EW (electronic warfare) teams successfully jammed GLONASS signals (the Russian satellite navigation system, a Russian alternative to GPS), making Strelets-M units ineffective unless accompanied by line-of-sight lasers or traditional rangefinders.

• Several captured Russian tablets were found with outdated maps and no signal, suggesting poor update logisticsand disconnection from central servers during mobile operations.

While Strelets-M provided structure and situational awareness in fortified positions, it proved less suited to mobile warfare, and units often reverted to voice radio or visual signals when digital systems failed.

Case Study 3: GIS Arta and FPV Drones in Bakhmut Defence (Spring 2023)

During the gruelling defence of Bakhmut, Ukrainian forces used GIS Arta in conjunction with first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drones, creating a fast-reacting system for targeting small Russian formations.

Integration details:

• Observers located enemy squads or vehicles via drone.

• GIS Arta allowed for instant fire solutions, not just for artillery but also for assigning nearby FPV drone operators.

• Drones were vector-assigned based on live GIS map data and could hit identified targets before they repositioned.

• GIS Arta’s backend also logged hit confirmations, which were fed back into its AI-assisted targeting database.

This allowed the Ukrainian defenders to “close the loop” (i.e. arrange accurate strikes on identified Russian positions) in under five minutes, outpacing Russian countermeasures and severely limiting Russian troop movement on key approach routes.

Case Study 4: Russian Digital Coordination Failures in the Zaporizhzhia Sector (Summer 2023)

In a failed Russian push near Orikhiv, to the east of Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian EW units reported capturing multiple Strelets-M tablets and intercepting communications revealing logistical confusion.

• Russian units lacked synchronised maps, and some Strelets tablets were reportedly used as glorified notepads.

• Russian artillery support was delayed by lack of satellite lock and inefficient fire delegation.

• According to Ukrainian SIGINT (signals intelligence) sources, Russian squads often had to wait for fire clearance from senior officers not present on site, despite having Strelets-equipped observers.

The inflexibility of Strelets-M under pressure contrasted sharply with Ukraine’s ad hoc but functional tablet-and-Starlink kits.

Conclusion: Systems That Reflect Doctrine

The battlefield experience shows that GIS Arta’s adaptability, decentralisation and integration with Ukraine’s digital volunteer network give it an edge in real-time combat. Its ability to “learn on the fly” and adapt to a dynamic frontline aligns with Ukraine’s broader warfighting doctrine: mobile, crowd-sourced, and fast.

Strelets-M, while advanced on paper, reflects the Russian military’s preference for centralised control and formal procedure. It is effective in static, high-structure conditions — but less so when units are isolated, mobile, or under electronic pressure.

As battlefield technologies continue to evolve, the contrast between GIS Arta and Strelets-M is not just technical; it is philosophical. One is a network of users feeding a living system. The other is a machine awaiting instructions.

And in a war where speed kills and data saves lives, that difference is decisive.