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A New Détente or a New Yalta? The Dangerous Promise of a Trump–Putin–Xi Summit

7 hours ago
18 min read

Matthew Parish


19 November 2026


There are moments in international diplomacy when the world appears to hold its breath. Three men meet behind closed doors, their conversations are concealed from the public and the fate of millions may depend upon what is said across a polished conference table. Such meetings can change the course of history, preventing wars, resolving dangerous misunderstandings and establishing new foundations for international peace. Equally, they can produce agreements of breathtaking cynicism, in which the powerful divide the interests and territories of the weak between themselves.


The prospect of a meeting between American President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping raises precisely these questions. These are the three leaders whose countries dominate contemporary strategic competition, possessing enormous military capabilities, nuclear arsenals and the capacity to shape the international economy. Yet they represent profoundly different political traditions and have radically different visions of the international order. Whether their encounter might herald a more peaceful international system or the beginning of a new arrangement between imperial powers is a question of considerable importance, particularly for those of us living in Ukraine.


Two historical analogies immediately suggest themselves. The first is President Richard Nixon's extraordinary rapprochement with Communist China in 1972, followed by his pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. The second is the Yalta Conference of February 1945, at which Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin discussed the shape of the post-war world, with consequences that would haunt Eastern Europe for decades. The distinction between these two precedents is of fundamental importance because one represents the possibility that diplomacy between ideological adversaries can make the world safer, while the other raises the disturbing possibility that powerful states may reach accommodations concerning the sovereignty and independence of other nations without seeking their consent.


The question, therefore, is whether a trilateral summit would represent a triumph of diplomatic realism or the beginning of a dangerous new age of great-power condominium. To understand the difference, we must revisit the historical circumstances in which détente first emerged, and consider how profoundly the international balance of power has changed since then.


Nixon's diplomatic revolution


When Richard Nixon travelled to Beijing in February 1972, he undertook one of the most audacious diplomatic initiatives of the twentieth century. The United States and Communist China had regarded one another as bitter enemies for more than two decades. Their soldiers had fought each other during the Korean War, their ideological systems were irreconcilable and China had emerged from the upheavals of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. Yet Nixon understood something that many of his contemporaries failed to appreciate: international relations are not governed exclusively by ideology, but also by the shifting distribution of power, mutual vulnerability and the uncomfortable reality that enemies may sometimes have common interests.


By the late 1960s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had deteriorated dramatically. The two communist powers were divided by ideological disagreements, territorial disputes and competing ambitions for leadership of the revolutionary world. Armed clashes along their common border in 1969 demonstrated that their hostility was not merely rhetorical. Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, recognised the opportunity presented by these developments.


By opening relations with Beijing, Washington could alter the strategic calculations of Moscow. The Soviet leadership would have to contemplate the possibility that its two principal adversaries might cooperate against it, while China would acquire an important counterweight to Soviet military power. This became known as triangular diplomacy, the essential feature of which was not simply that Washington maintained relations with two communist powers, but that the hostility between those powers allowed the United States to improve its strategic position.


Nixon's subsequent visit to Moscow in May 1972 produced important agreements limiting strategic weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems. The Soviet Union and the United States remained ideological adversaries, but they had begun constructing a framework for managing their competition without allowing it to escalate into nuclear catastrophe. Détente did not mean friendship, but the recognition that even mortal enemies possess an overriding common interest in avoiding their mutual destruction.


The policy was neither morally uncomplicated nor entirely successful. The Vietnam War continued, authoritarian regimes benefited from superpower patronage and the international system remained divided. Nevertheless, Nixon's achievement was to recognise that dialogue could serve national interests without necessarily requiring ideological surrender. He was capable of making the distinction between compromising with an adversary on matters of mutual security and accepting that adversary's political values or territorial ambitions.


That remains an important lesson for the present day. There is nothing inherently reprehensible about an American president meeting the leaders of Russia and China. Indeed, given the terrifying destructive capabilities of their respective states, there are compelling reasons why they should maintain channels of communication. The difficulty arises when we examine how profoundly the strategic circumstances have changed.


The triangle has been reversed


In 1972, China and the Soviet Union were adversaries. Today, China and Russia are strategic partners, notwithstanding the historical mistrust that continues to exist between them. Their relationship is not a formal military alliance comparable to NATO, but it has become increasingly important to both governments. Each sees advantages in resisting what it regards as excessive American influence over the international system.


Russia supplies China with substantial quantities of energy, while China provides Russia with markets, technology, industrial goods and diplomatic cooperation. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these relationships have become particularly significant to Moscow, whose access to Western markets and technology has been restricted by sanctions. Russia has consequently become increasingly dependent upon China, while Beijing has acquired a strategically useful partner that distracts American and European resources, challenges Western diplomatic influence and supplies energy to the Chinese economy.


There are nevertheless tensions within this relationship. China has no particular interest in becoming permanently subordinate to Russia's ambitions, nor does Beijing necessarily benefit from an unlimited escalation of the war in Ukraine. A prolonged disruption of international trade or a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO would create substantial risks for the Chinese economy. Likewise, China is unlikely to welcome every aspect of Russian strategic behaviour, particularly when it threatens the economic stability upon which Chinese prosperity depends.


Nevertheless, the strategic circumstances are almost the inverse of those Nixon encountered. The United States is no longer exploiting a profound division between Moscow and Beijing. It is attempting to negotiate with two governments whose cooperation has strengthened substantially, even if their interests are not identical. This distinction is critical because the assumptions underlying Nixon's triangular diplomacy cannot simply be transposed onto the circumstances of the present day.


If Trump imagines that a warm personal relationship with Putin might draw Russia away from China, he must confront the structural realities underlying their partnership. Russia's economic dependence upon Beijing and its hostility towards much of the Western security system cannot be dissolved through a successful presidential summit. Indeed, Moscow may welcome the prospect that Washington will offer concessions to improve relations with Russia while Russia retains its increasingly valuable Chinese partnership.


For Putin, this would represent an attractive outcome. He could secure international recognition as the leader of a great power, strengthen his political standing at home and perhaps obtain concessions concerning Ukraine, without necessarily making comparable concessions in return. The danger is that an attempt to reproduce Nixon's great diplomatic achievement might instead deliver the reverse result, strengthening Russia's international position without substantially weakening the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing.


The nuclear argument


There is nevertheless a serious and potentially persuasive argument in favour of a trilateral summit. The international architecture for controlling nuclear weapons has deteriorated alarmingly, while the development of new delivery systems and the increasing sophistication of nuclear technology have introduced additional uncertainties into an already dangerous international environment. The possibility of nuclear conflict between major powers remains one of the gravest threats confronting humanity, even if the populations of Western countries have largely ceased to contemplate it in their everyday lives.


The New START Treaty, the last major bilateral agreement imposing verifiable limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, expired on 5 February 2026. Its disappearance removed an important component of the system of mutual restraint constructed during and after the Cold War. The international community must now contemplate the prospect of renewed strategic competition without the same degree of institutionalised verification and mutual limitation that previous generations of diplomats painstakingly negotiated.


Meanwhile, China is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces. Although its arsenal remains substantially smaller than those of either Russia or the United States, China's nuclear modernisation has proceeded at remarkable speed. An international system in which three enormous powers accumulate increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons, without adequate agreements concerning their deployment, verification and strategic intentions, is inherently dangerous.


A trilateral nuclear arms control process would therefore be a legitimate and potentially valuable objective. The difficulty is that China has traditionally resisted accepting the same limitations as Russia and the United States, arguing that its arsenal is substantially smaller. Beijing may reasonably question whether an agreement designed around two much larger nuclear powers would restrict Chinese capabilities disproportionately, particularly when it considers the United States its principal strategic competitor.


Nevertheless, an agreement establishing transparency, confidence-building measures and mechanisms for preventing accidental escalation would be valuable, even if comprehensive nuclear reductions proved impossible. Such measures could include better communication between military commands, advance notification of sensitive exercises and clearer procedures for managing incidents involving strategic forces. These are not glamorous achievements, but they represent precisely the kind of practical arrangements through which international diplomacy can prevent catastrophe.


If a meeting between Trump, Putin and Xi produced the beginnings of a credible trilateral nuclear arms control process, it would be a diplomatic achievement worthy of recognition. The prevention of nuclear war is not a partisan cause, nor should it be subordinated to hostility towards the governments with which agreements must be negotiated. This is the strongest argument for a modern form of détente: dialogue between adversaries can protect humanity from the consequences of their mutual suspicions.


Yet arms control and territorial concessions are entirely different matters. One must not become the price of the other, and any attempt to exchange strategic stability for concessions regarding the sovereignty of third countries would fundamentally corrupt the purposes of an otherwise legitimate diplomatic initiative.


The spectre of Yalta


For Ukrainians, the more troubling historical parallel is not Nixon's visit to Beijing but the Yalta Conference of February 1945. There, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union discussed the future of Europe as Nazi Germany approached defeat. The Soviet army already occupied much of Eastern Europe, and Stalin was determined to preserve Soviet strategic dominance over territories through which Russia had repeatedly been invaded.


The historical reality was more complicated than the popular image of three statesmen simply drawing lines across a map. The Yalta agreements contained commitments to democratic government and free elections in liberated European states, but those commitments were subsequently disregarded or manipulated as Soviet power consolidated itself across Eastern Europe. The lofty principles articulated in diplomatic communiqués proved inadequate protection against the political realities of military occupation.


Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria found themselves increasingly incorporated into an authoritarian political order dominated by Moscow. The aspirations of their populations were subordinated to the strategic calculations of the superpowers, while the Western democracies possessed limited practical means of reversing Soviet domination without risking another catastrophic war. For those societies, Yalta became a symbol of betrayal because the governments of powerful countries had negotiated over their futures while the populations most directly affected possessed little practical influence over the outcome.


There is a particular historical bitterness in contemplating a contemporary equivalent of Yalta while Russia is conducting a war against Ukraine. Crimea, where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin assembled in February 1945, is internationally recognised as Ukrainian territory. It was occupied and purportedly annexed by Russia in 2014, and the symbolism of this historical connection is impossible to overlook.


For the Kremlin, the idea of a new settlement between Washington, Moscow and Beijing is attractive precisely because it implies a world in which a small number of powerful states possess special privileges in determining the security arrangements of entire regions. Ukraine might be treated as belonging within a Russian sphere of influence, while Taiwan might become an element of American-Chinese strategic bargaining. The security concerns of Central and Eastern European countries might be subordinated to a supposedly greater international accommodation, restoring the principle that the fate of smaller countries should be decided in the capitals of empires.


Such an arrangement would not represent détente in the constructive sense of reducing mutual threats. It would represent a restoration of imperial diplomacy, under which some nations possess sovereignty while others enjoy it only conditionally, subject to the approval of more powerful neighbours. That proposition is incompatible with the central principles of the post-1945 international legal order, and it would render the prohibition upon aggressive territorial conquest increasingly meaningless.


What does each leader want?


An important distinction must be drawn between the interests of the three participants. Although they may share a desire to be recognised as world leaders, their practical objectives differ considerably. Understanding these differences is essential because the possibility of a successful diplomatic outcome depends upon whether their competing interests can be reconciled without sacrificing the rights of other countries.


Trump appears interested in achieving agreements that demonstrate his capacity to settle international disputes through personal negotiation. Nuclear arms control, international trade, regional conflicts and the war in Ukraine all offer potential opportunities for diplomatic achievement. It would be unreasonable to assume that these ambitions are inherently illegitimate, because a president who can reduce the risk of nuclear conflict or bring an end to an exceptionally destructive war has accomplished something important, whatever his political style.


Nevertheless, Trump's preference for direct personal diplomacy carries risks. International agreements are rarely the product of political chemistry alone, and their durability depends upon institutions, verification mechanisms, enforceable commitments and careful consideration of the interests of allies. A settlement that appears attractive in a private conversation between presidents may prove disastrous if it ignores the complex political and strategic circumstances that must sustain it.


Putin's objectives are rather different. Russia has spent years attempting to persuade the international community that her invasion of Ukraine reflects legitimate security interests that must be accommodated by the West. A summit in which Putin stands alongside the presidents of the United States and China offers him a powerful symbolic victory because Russia is presented not as an aggressor whose conduct requires international restraint, but as one of the principal architects of a new global order.


Putin would doubtless prefer negotiations in which Ukrainian territorial concessions, restrictions upon Ukraine's military capabilities and limitations upon NATO's future activities were treated as matters for discussion between the great powers. Such an arrangement would reinforce the Kremlin's longstanding contention that Ukraine does not possess an entirely independent strategic identity, but that its future must be determined in consultation with Moscow. The danger is that international recognition of Russia's great-power status might gradually become confused with recognition of Russia's claims to special rights over its neighbours.


Xi's position is more complicated. China benefits from demonstrating that she can convene the leaders of the world's principal nuclear powers and thereby exercise global diplomatic influence. Beijing also has a strong interest in preserving economic stability and avoiding a direct military confrontation with the United States, particularly given the importance of international trade to the Chinese economy.


Yet Xi may have little desire to become responsible for negotiating a settlement of the war in Ukraine. China has consistently sought to balance its strategic relationship with Moscow against its economic interests elsewhere, including in Europe. Beijing may recognise that an overt attempt to divide the interests of smaller nations amongst great powers would damage its carefully cultivated diplomatic image, particularly among countries of the Global South that remain sensitive to the historical legacy of imperialism.


The three men therefore approach such a meeting with overlapping ambitions but divergent objectives. This may limit the possibility of a comprehensive bargain, although it does not eliminate the risks associated with informal understandings. Indeed, it is sometimes the informal understandings reached between powerful leaders, rather than the formal treaties they sign, that prove most consequential for the countries absent from the negotiating table.


Ukraine cannot be negotiated away


From the Ukrainian perspective, the essential question is straightforward. Would the leaders discuss measures that might contribute to a just and durable peace, or would they negotiate concessions that Ukraine itself has not authorised? The answer matters because Ukraine is not simply a territorial dispute between Russia and the West, but an independent European country whose population has fought for years to preserve its right to determine its own future.


There is no objection in principle to Washington discussing the war with Moscow, or to China encouraging Russia to end its invasion. Indeed, effective diplomacy with Russia may be indispensable to ending the conflict. But there is an enormous difference between negotiating with an aggressor to establish the conditions for peace and allowing that aggressor to dictate the political future of its neighbour.


Any settlement that requires Ukrainian territorial concessions, limitations upon Ukrainian sovereignty or fundamental restrictions upon Ukraine's ability to defend itself must be acceptable to Ukraine's own legitimate institutions. The same principle applies to European security more generally, because Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and other NATO members cannot be expected to accept arrangements negotiated over their heads by Washington and Moscow. Security guarantees lose much of their value if the countries intended to benefit from them are excluded from the process through which their terms are determined.


The lesson of the twentieth century is not merely that wars must eventually end through diplomacy. It is that peace agreements imposed upon unwilling populations may preserve the conditions for future conflict, particularly when they reward aggression and encourage the belief that military force can achieve political objectives. Diplomatic settlements are most durable when the parties whose interests they affect believe that their essential rights have been preserved.


The Munich Agreement of September 1938 is another historical warning. Its principal participants believed they were preventing a European war through territorial concessions to an expansionist dictator. The country whose territory was being sacrificed, Czechoslovakia, was excluded from the decisive negotiations, and the agreement proved incapable of satisfying Adolf Hitler's wider territorial ambitions.


Munich and Yalta were different events, occurring under very different circumstances. Yet both remain warnings about the dangers of great powers assuming that smaller nations can be treated as instruments of international stability rather than independent political communities. For Ukraine, the danger is not diplomacy itself, but diplomacy that confuses the absence of immediate fighting with the creation of a sustainable peace.


A ceasefire that leaves Ukraine exposed to renewed invasion, without effective security guarantees, may simply postpone the next war. Such an arrangement would be especially dangerous if Russia emerged from negotiations with substantial territorial gains, international sanctions relief and the opportunity to rebuild its military forces. The true measure of a peace agreement is not whether it produces an immediate reduction in violence, but whether it establishes credible conditions under which that violence is unlikely to resume.


The forgotten achievement of détente


There is another historical precedent worth remembering, one that offers a more constructive model for contemporary diplomacy. In August 1975, thirty-five states signed the Helsinki Final Act, establishing principles governing security and cooperation in Europe. These included respect for sovereign equality, the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes and fundamental human rights.


The Helsinki process emerged from the broader atmosphere of East-West détente, yet it did not simply recognise unlimited Soviet authority over Eastern Europe. Its principles eventually gave dissidents and human rights movements important standards against which authoritarian governments could be judged. The Soviet Union had hoped that the agreements would consolidate recognition of the existing European territorial order, but the human rights commitments incorporated into the settlement developed a political significance that Moscow had not fully anticipated.


This was one of détente's more enduring achievements. It established that reducing tensions between powerful states need not require abandoning the rights of individuals or the independence of smaller countries. Indeed, carefully constructed diplomatic agreements can strengthen the position of vulnerable societies by creating internationally recognised standards of conduct against which governments may be assessed.


A modern diplomatic initiative involving Washington, Moscow and Beijing could pursue similar objectives. It could encourage nuclear restraint, establish mechanisms to prevent accidental military confrontation, develop rules governing emerging technologies and promote measures to reduce the risk of conflict in contested regions. These are areas in which practical cooperation might be possible even among governments that remain deeply suspicious of one another.


In Ukraine, such diplomacy could support prisoner exchanges, the return of unlawfully transferred civilians and children, protection of nuclear facilities and credible arrangements for a negotiated peace. These would be worthwhile accomplishments that would not require recognising Russia's territorial claims or acknowledging any entitlement to control Ukraine's political future. The essential distinction is between cooperation founded upon rules and cooperation founded upon power alone.


The temptation of imperial nostalgia


There is a psychological dimension to a meeting between Trump, Putin and Xi that should not be overlooked. All three leaders have, in different ways, emphasised the historical greatness of their respective nations. Trump speaks of restoring American greatness, Putin invokes the lost power and territorial reach of Russia, while Xi presents China's contemporary development as the restoration of its rightful place in world civilisation after a long period of national humiliation.


These political narratives differ substantially, and it would be wrong to equate the political systems of the United States, Russia and China. The United States remains a constitutional democracy with competitive elections and institutions capable of constraining executive power, however fiercely those constraints may be contested. Russia and China are authoritarian political systems in which executive authority is exercised under fundamentally different institutional conditions. Nevertheless, each national narrative contains an appeal to historical power and the prestige of national leadership.


This creates an unusual diplomatic danger. The three leaders might find common ground not in the defence of a rules-based international order, but in a shared belief that history is made principally by powerful states and exceptional individuals. Such a conception of international politics can encourage the assumption that weaker countries ought to accommodate themselves to the preferences of the strong, particularly when those preferences are presented as the natural expression of historical destiny.


There is something seductive about such an understanding. It promises simplicity in a world of extraordinary complexity, suggesting that instead of negotiating with dozens of governments, international organisations and competing political constituencies, three leaders might determine the essential terms of global stability. The world becomes a chessboard upon which the great powers move pieces according to their strategic calculations, while the wishes of the populations concerned become secondary considerations.


Yet the world is not a chessboard upon which only three players possess legitimate interests. The populations of Ukraine, Taiwan, the Baltic states, Japan, South Korea and countless other societies have interests, political institutions and historical experiences that cannot simply be discounted because their countries possess fewer nuclear weapons. A stable international order must recognise the power of the great states while limiting the arbitrary exercise of that power, because otherwise international diplomacy becomes little more than the administration of imperial privilege.


What should success look like?


The appropriate response to the prospect of a trilateral summit is neither unqualified enthusiasm nor automatic condemnation. It would be foolish to reject diplomatic engagement merely because the participating leaders are controversial or because their governments possess conflicting interests. Nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence and the dangers of modern warfare make communication between great powers essential, and there are genuine opportunities for international cooperation even between governments whose underlying values are profoundly different.


At the same time, diplomatic success cannot be measured by the grandeur of the occasion, the warmth of the handshakes or the ambition of the final communiqué. International politics is littered with photographs of leaders celebrating agreements that subsequently proved worthless. What matters is whether diplomatic commitments produce changes in state behaviour, whether their implementation can be verified and whether they establish lasting restraints upon the arbitrary use of military power.


A successful summit would establish credible mechanisms for further arms control discussions, reduce the probability of military miscalculation and encourage concrete steps towards ending existing conflicts. It would also reaffirm that sovereignty is not a privilege distributed by powerful states, but a right enjoyed by all nations under international law. Any agreement concerning the future of Ukraine would have to involve Ukraine itself, just as any settlement affecting European security would require the meaningful participation of the European countries concerned.


A dangerous summit, by contrast, would produce informal agreements recognising exclusive spheres of influence, encourage territorial concessions by countries absent from the negotiating table or weaken the security commitments upon which smaller states depend. The worst outcome might not even be a formal agreement. It could be the emergence of an unspoken understanding that Washington, Moscow and Beijing should accommodate one another's regional ambitions in exchange for reduced confrontation elsewhere.


Such an arrangement would encourage precisely the kind of expansionism that international institutions were established to restrain. Russia might conclude that military intervention in its neighbourhood would be tolerated so long as it remained within an implicitly recognised sphere of influence. China might interpret American concessions elsewhere as evidence that Washington was increasingly prepared to accommodate Chinese territorial ambitions. Other states would then have incentives either to acquire more powerful weapons or to seek protection through regional military alliances, thereby producing an international system more unstable than the one the negotiations were intended to improve.


Détente or capitulation?


The fundamental difference between Nixon's diplomatic revolution and a potentially sinister outcome in a Trump–Putin–Xi summit lies in the purpose of diplomacy. Nixon sought to alter the strategic balance by exploiting differences between rival powers, while constructing agreements that reduced the dangers inherent in their competition. His policies were controversial, occasionally cynical and imperfect, but they were informed by an understanding that international stability required practical restraints upon the exercise of power.


A new Yalta, by contrast, would seek stability through mutual recognition of spheres of influence, accepting that powerful countries enjoy exceptional entitlements over their neighbours. It would restore an understanding of international politics more characteristic of the nineteenth century than of the international legal order established after 1945. Under such a system, the sovereignty of smaller countries would become a negotiable commodity, while the ability of larger states to exert military and economic pressure would determine the boundaries of legitimate political independence.


It is entirely possible that a trilateral summit would produce neither of these outcomes. The leaders may discover that their interests are too divergent for any substantial agreement, and their discussions may conclude with reassuring declarations, carefully staged photographs and promises of further discussions. Yet even an inconclusive summit can establish precedents, and precedents matter enormously in international relations because they gradually shape expectations about which forms of state conduct are considered acceptable.


If the encounter strengthens the principle that nuclear powers must communicate, it will have served a useful purpose. If it strengthens the proposition that the world's most powerful leaders can privately determine the political future of smaller nations, it will have done profound damage. The distinction may not become apparent immediately, particularly if the participants prefer ambiguity concerning the concessions they have discussed.


For those of us living in Ukraine, these questions are not abstractions concerning international relations theory. They concern the continued independence of a country whose people have endured years of bombardment, displacement, bereavement and extraordinary sacrifice in defence of their political freedom. Ukrainians do not oppose peace, and they have more reason to desire it than almost anyone. But they understand from bitter historical experience that peace cannot safely be founded upon the assumption that their country exists merely as an object of negotiation between more powerful states.


The finest achievement of diplomacy is not the creation of a world in which the strongest can agree upon their respective privileges. It is the establishment of a world in which the strongest accept limits upon what they may do to the weakest. This is the test by which any meeting between Trump, Putin and Xi should ultimately be judged, whatever declarations of friendship or international stability might emerge from their discussions.


If these three leaders can begin constructing a safer international order without compromising the independence of the countries their decisions affect, their meeting may eventually deserve comparison with Nixon's greatest diplomatic achievement. If, however, they seek to divide the world into spheres of influence and to make peace by sacrificing the sovereign rights of others, their encounter will deserve a far darker place in history.


The difference between détente and appeasement is not whether one talks to one's adversaries, because diplomacy necessarily requires us to speak with those whose conduct we oppose. The difference lies in what one is prepared to surrender in order to secure their friendship, and whether the price of international stability is paid by the negotiators themselves or imposed upon those who were never invited to the table.

 
 

Note from Matthew Parish, Editor-in-Chief. The Lviv Herald is a unique and independent source of analytical journalism about the war in Ukraine and its aftermath, and all the geopolitical and diplomatic consequences of the war as well as the tremendous advances in military technology the war has yielded. To achieve this independence, we rely exclusively on donations. Please donate if you can, with the buttons at the top of this page.

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